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DISEASE-BRANDING AND DRUG-MONGERING:
COULD PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROMOTIONAL
PRACTICES RESULT IN TORT LIABILITY?
Jason S. Cetel

I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a forty-five-year-old woman who has been happily married for fifteen years presenting to her physician with complaints of
1
infrequent sexual thoughts and fantasies. After a history and physical examination, the physician diagnoses her as having low sexual de2
sire. But does she have an actual disease? A few decades ago, this
woman would not have had a recognizable disease, and there was no
3
official diagnosis. Today, she could be diagnosed with some form of
4
Female Sexual Dysfunction (FSD) or Hypoactive Sexual Desire Dis5
order (HSDD). The evolution of these symptoms into a recogniza∗
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1
See Rosemary Basson, Sexual Desire and Arousal Disorders in Women, 354 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1497, 1497 (2006).
2
Id.
3
See Sexual Dysfunction—Sexual Desire Disorders, Sexual Arousal Disorders, Orgasm
Disorders, Sexual Pain Disorders, Sex Therapy, JRANK: MARRIAGE AND FAM. ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://family.jrank.org/pages/1508/Sexual-Dysfunction.html (last visited Feb. 4,
2012) (“Psychosexual disorders were listed for the first time in 1980 in the third edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-III), a handbook used by almost all mental health professionals.”). Compare AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed., 1968), and AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed., 1980), with AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 293 (3d rev. ed.,
1987) (containing Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder, Diagnostic Code 302.71), and
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
541 (4th ed., text rev., 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR, 2000] (same).
4
Ray Moynihan, The Marketing of a Disease: Female Sexual Dysfunction, 330 BRIT.
MED.
J.
192,
192
(2005),
available
at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC545000/pdf/bmj33000192.pdf.
5
Id.; see also DSM-IV-TR, 2000, supra note 3, at 541; Basson, supra note 1, at 1498
tbl.2.
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ble disease occurred through a process of social construction and
medicalization. It is called disease-branding, and HSDD provides a
6
quintessential example of this practice.
Disease-branding is the pharmaceutical advertising practice of
transforming symptoms into disease-states and coining new clinical
7
names to identify them. This practice legitimizes diseases in the eyes
8
of consumer-patients as a pretext to push drug treatments on them.
The concept of disease-branding has gained heightened attention in
9
the media. In October 2010, the New York Times’ resident lexicog6

See Andrew Moseman, Skeptics of “Female Viagra” Say Drug Co’s Are “Disease Brand(June
18,
2010,
9:59
AM),
ing,”
80BEATS
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/80beats/2010/06/18/skeptics-of-female-viagrasay-drug-cos-are-disease-branding/. The creation of “Metabolic Syndrome” provides
another example of disease branding:
Most people may not have heard of metabolic syndrome, but that is
likely to change. Once known mysteriously as Syndrome X, the condition, a precursor to heart disease and type 2 diabetes, is about to be
transformed into a household name by the US pharmaceutical industry
and its partners in the medical profession. A society dedicated to addressing the condition has been organized, a journal has been started,
and an education campaign launched. Patients are already being tested
for metabolic syndrome. As the trade publication Pharmaceutical Executive said in its January 2004 issue: “A new disease is being born.”
Howard Wolinsky, Disease Mongering and Drug Marketing: Does the Pharmaceutical Industry Manufacture Diseases as Well as Drugs?, 6 EUR. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORG. REP. 612,
612 (2005) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted), available at
http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v6/n7/pdf/7400476.pdf.
7
Ray Moynihan, The Merging of Marketing and Medical Science, ABC NEWS ONLINE
(Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/stories/s2996546.htm. See generally Anne Landman, Branding Diseases to Sell Cures, PR WATCH BLOG (Oct. 12, 2010,
12:44 PM), http://www.prwatch.org/node/9529 (“Once people are convinced they
have a new condition, they will seek treatment on their own, and new drugs will sell
themselves.”); Vince Parry, Branding Disease, PHARM. EXEC. (Oct. 15, 2007),
http://pharmexec.findpharma.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=465561
&pageID=1&sk=&date=.
8
See Wolinsky, supra note 6, at 612.
9
See, e.g., Elizabeth Mari, New Buzzword of 2010: “Disease Branding,” BEYOND MY
TWO CENTS (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.beyondmytwocents.com/new-buzzword-of2010-disease-branding/; Ben Schott, Disease Branding, SCHOTT’S VOCAB (Oct. 18,
2010, 1:30 PM), http://schott.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/disease-branding/.
Comedians and pundits in the popular media have also observed this phenomenon.
See, e.g., Bill Maher-Anti-Pharma Rant, YOUTUBE (Sept. 30, 2007),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rHXXTCc-IVg&feature=related.
Because you see the government isn’t your nanny, they’re your dealer.
And they subsidize illness in America. They have to; there’s too much
money in it. You see, there’s no money in healthy people. And there’s
no money in dead people. The money is in the middle. People who
are alive, sort of. But with one or more chronic conditions that puts
them in need of Celebrex, or Nasonex, or Valtrex, or Lunesta. . . .
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rapher, blogging about the recent coinage of “disease-branding,” defined it as the practice of “[h]yping the profile of a medical condition
10
in order to sell its treatment.” In its more extreme form, critics have
pejoratively characterized disease-branding as the practice of “trying
to convince essentially well people that they are sick, or slightly sick
11
people that they are very ill.” Disease-branding has even been referred to as “the most insidious of the various forms that medical ad12
vertising . . . and medical diagnosis can take.”
When pharmaceutical companies attempt to push drug treatments on patients through disease-branding strategies such as directto-consumer (DTC) advertising, they are engaging in a practice
13
called “drug-mongering.” Drug-mongering is inextricably linked to
disease-branding: it refers to the practice of persuading consumers
that they are afflicted with the branded disease and thus require the
advertised drug treatment. Bioethicist Professor Dr. Carl Elliot explains this as a two-part process in which drug companies sell their
14
drugs by selling the diseases they treat. Essentially, branding a disease “is to shape its public perception in order to make it more palat15
able to potential patients.” Once a disease is successfully branded,
drug companies engage in drug-mongering by persuading consumerpatients that they need to use the company’s drugs to treat the dis16
ease. The confluence of disease-branding and drug-mongering is
[There are emerging epidemics and] a long list of ailments, which
used to be rare and have now been mainstreamed.
Id. Bill Maher is correct that there is money in drug-mongering because treating
chronic conditions is much more profitable than curing them. The suggestion that
the FDA, however, as the representative agency of the government, implicitly legitimizes the mainstreaming of ailments through its approval process misconstrues the
FDA’s mandate, which is to approve drugs as safe and effective for their intended
use, not to determine what the intended use is or should be. See infra Part II.B.
10
Schott, supra note 9.
11
Wolinsky, supra note 6, at 612 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
12
Id.
13
Although the term “drug-mongering” does not seem to be used in the literature—“disease-mongering” is the preferred terminology—this Comment uses the
concepts of “disease-branding” and “drug-mongering” as separate practices that are
intimately related, are complementary, and act synergistically for pharmaceutical
promotional practices to be effective.
14
Carl Elliott, How to Brand a Disease—and Sell a Cure, CNN.COM (Oct. 11, 2010,
2:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/10/11/elliott.branding.disease/
index.html?iref=allsearch.
15
Id.
16
Id. (“Once a branded disease has achieved a degree of cultural legitimacy,
there is no need to convince anyone that a drug to treat it is necessary. It will come
to him as his own idea.”).
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the essence of pharmaceutical promotional practices, and these promotional practices provide the context and analytical framework for
this Comment.
The development of HSDD demonstrates a disease-branding
17
and drug-mongering strategy. According to Ray Moynihan, an investigative journalist and vocal opponent of pharmaceutical promotional practices, drug companies have diligently tried to convince
18
women that they need a drug to treat low libido. He notes that
pharmaceutical companies “have helped create the measurement
and diagnostic instruments to persuade women that their sexual dif19
ficulties deserve a medical label and treatment.”
Flibanserin is a drug that was developed to treat HSDD, and the
drug sponsor’s briefing document, prepared for the Food and Drug
Administration’s (FDA) Reproductive Health Drugs Advisory Com20
mittee meeting regarding flibanserin’s New Drug Application
21
(NDA), reported positive safety and efficacy data. But the FDA’s
17
Moseman, supra note 6 (“This is really a classic case of disease branding. . . .
The messages are aimed at medicalizing normal conditions, and also preying on the
insecurity of both the clinician and the patient.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Contra Nancy Zielinski, Treatments Needed to Treat Female Sexual Dysfunction
Experts
Say,
EXAMINER.COM
(Jan.
10,
2011,
11:12
AM),
http://www.examiner.com/sexual-health-in-grand-rapids/treatments-needed-totreat-female-sexual-dysfunction-experts-say?cid=parsely#parsely (noting that ninety
percent of doctors surveyed accept the need for an FDA-approved treatment).
18
Kathleen Blanchard, Female Sexual Dysfunction: Are Drug Companies Manufactur(Oct.
2,
2010,
2:45
PM),
ing
a
Disease?,
EXAMINER.COM
http://www.examiner.com/women-s-health-in-national/female-sexual-dysfunctionare-drug-companies-manufacturing-a-disease.
19
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
20
An advisory committee is composed of outside scientific and medical experts as
well as industry, consumer, and patient representatives who provide the FDA with
independent advice on regulatory decisions. See Questions and Answers Regarding Advisory Committee Membership, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/
AboutAdvisoryCommittees/CommitteeMembership/ucm117646.htm (last visited
Jan. 20, 2012); see also U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR THE PUBLIC
AND FDA STAFF ON CONVENING ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETINGS 3 (2008), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM125651.
pdf (“FDA’s advisory committees provide independent expert advice to the agency
on a range of complex scientific, technical, and policy issues. An advisory committee
meeting also provides a forum for a public hearing on important matters. Although
advisory committees provide recommendations to FDA, FDA makes the final decisions.”).
21
BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM, FLIBANSERIN BRIEFING DOCUMENT 22 (2010), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials
/Drugs/ReproductiveHealthDrugsAdvisoryCommittee/UCM215438.pdf.
Flibanserin therapy, at the recommended dosing regimen . . . resulted
in statistically significant and clinically relevant improvements of the
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Advisory Committee unanimously rejected flibanserin, and the
sponsor discontinued seeking approval before the FDA could take fi23
nal regulatory action on the NDA. Although HSDD has evolved into
a recognized disease, its treatment has failed to co-evolve—there are
currently no FDA-approved pharmaceutical options available to treat
24
this condition. Without a drug to sell, drug companies are unable

hallmark symptoms of HSDD in premenopausal women based on patient-based assessments of sexual desire, sexual distress, sexual activity,
sexual function, and overall patient benefit. In general, flibanserin is
well-tolerated as the AEs reported during the development program
were non-serious and mild in severity. Currently, women face extremely limited options when seeking help for HSDD. It is important that
women suffering from HSDD and their health care providers have an
approved treatment option available to them. As the first pharmacologic therapy for HSDD in premenopausal women, if approved,
Flibanserin would appreciably expand the HSDD treatment armamentarium and the choices available to women.
Id.; see also Press Release, Boehringer Ingelheim, Women with Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder (HSDD) Report That Flibanserin Increased Their Sexual Desire and
Reduced Associated Distress (May 19, 2010), available at http://www.boehringeringelheim.com/news/news_releases/press_releases/2010/19_may_2010.html.
22
Emily P. Walker, Company Halts “Female Viagra” Development, MEDPAGE TODAY
(Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.medpagetoday.com/ProductAlert/Prescriptions/22697
(“The committee also voted 11 to 0 that the company failed to demonstrate that the
benefits of flibanserin outweigh the risks, which include fainting, accidental injury,
insomnia, and fatigue.”); see also Duff Wilson, Drug for Sexual Desire Disorder Opposed by
Panel, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2010, at B3; “Female Viagra” Falls Short, FDA Says,
MSNBC.COM (June 16, 2010, 2:35 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37727629/;
David W. Freeman, “Female Viagra” a Flop, Says FDA Panel, CBS NEWS (June 17, 2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/17/health/main6591413.shtml.
23
Press Release, Boehringer Ingelheim, Following Regulatory Feedback
Boehringer Ingelheim Decides to Discontinue Flibanserin Development (Oct. 8,
2010),
available
at
http://www.boehringeringelheim.com/news/news_releases/press_releases/2010/08_october_2010_fliba.ht
ml.
Boehringer Ingelheim announced today the decision to discontinue
the development of its investigational compound flibanserin for the
treatment of Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder (HSDD). The company continues to believe in the value that flibanserin would have for
women suffering with HSDD, a significant and recognized medical
condition which impacts the lives of many women around the world.
Id.; Boehringer Pulls the Plug on “Pink Viagra,” REUTERS (Oct. 8, 2010, 11:55 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/08/us-boehringer-flibanserinidUSTRE6970TN20101008.
24
Jennifer Corbett Dooren, FDA Questions Safety of “Female Viagra,” WALL ST. J.,
June 17, 2010, at D2 [hereinafter Dooren, FDA Questions]; Jennifer Corbett Dooren,
Panel Rejects “Pink Viagra” to Boost Female Libido, WALL ST. J (June 18, 2010, 5:50 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704122904575315140487376022.h
tml; cf. Basson, supra note 1, at 1502–03 tbl.4 (noting the absence of FDA-approved
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to engage in drug-mongering, but flibanserin still remains one of the
25
most recent attempts at disease-branding. Despite the lack of an
FDA-approved drug to treat HSDD, the controversy surrounding the
26
branding of this disease remains. Annemarie Jutel, a medical sociologist, suggests that
[i]n a society which portrays female hypersexuality as desirable,
and where women’s tumultuous lives don’t usually result in perfectly timed and balanced sexual urges, it hasn’t been hard to describe low libido as abnormal in order to sell an expensive
cure . . . . The problem is the hidden commercial interests behind
the science . . . . Sexuality is a complex expression of social, cultural, psychological, and physiological factors and many of us
struggle with it, without being “sick.” Don’t let the pharmaceutical
27
industry tell you otherwise.

Commenting on the controversy surrounding the definition of
HSDD, Psychiatry Professor Dr. Ronald Pies notes that “in weighing
this spectrum of divergent views, it’s clear that much turns on our
philosophical understanding of terms such as ‘disease,’ ‘disorder,’
medications, but the possibility of off-label uses). In a hypothetical case study of a
woman with low sexual desire, Dr. Basson stated that
[o]n the basis of clinical experience and limited data on outcomes, I
would recommend a combination of cognitive behavioral therapy and
sex therapy . . . . Any apparent interpersonal problems should be addressed before further sexual therapy is pursued. At the present time, I
would not recommend any pharmacologic therapy, pending the availability of more (and longer-term) data in support of such treatment.
Id. at 1504–05.
25
See Moseman, supra note 6; Press Release, BioSante Pharmaceuticals Reports
®
Positive LibiGel Safety Data Review for Phase III Program (Feb. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.biosantepharma.com/News-Releases.php?ID=020912
(describing
LibiGel as a drug “in development for the treatment of female sexual dysfunction
(FSD), specifically, hypoactive sexual desire disorder (HSDD) in menopausal women.”).
26
See, e.g., Moynihan, supra note 4; Leonore Tiefer, Female Sexual Dysfunction: A
Case Study of Disease Mongering and Activist Resistance, 3 PLOS MED. 436, 436 (2006),
available
at
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/
info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0030178; Natasha Singer, Sex and the Single
Drug, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2010, at BU3; Duff Wilson, Push to Market Pill Stirs Debate on
Sexual Desire, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2010, at A1; Annemarie Jutel, Why the Cure for Flagging Female Libido is Hard to Swallow, BRISBANE TIMES (Dec. 8, 2009),
http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/lifestyle/diet-and-fitness/why-the-cure-forflagging-female-libido-is-hard-to-swallow-20091207-ketm.html; Ray Moynihan, Sex
Drugs for Women Don’t Seem to Be Working, ABC NEWS ONLINE (Sept. 1, 2010),
http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/stories/s2998870.htm; Susan Seligson, Female Libido Pill Leaves Ethicist Cold, BU TODAY ONLINE (June 25, 2010),
http://www.bu.edu/today/node/11179.
27
Jutel, supra note 26.
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28

‘dysfunction,’ and ‘medical condition.’” The controversy essentially
encompasses the cultural, social, medical, and (in this Comment) legal significance of disease-branding and drug-mongering—their impact on regulatory decision-making, interaction with statutory rules,
and other potential legal ramifications.
Disease-branding and drug-mongering are the pharmaceutical
promotional practices of “selling sickness” by widening the boundaries of diagnosable illnesses in order to expand the market for drug
29
treatments. They are “a process that encourages the conversion of
socially created anxiety into medical diagnoses suitable for pharmaco30
logical treatment.” Critics argue that these promotional practices
“turn[] healthy people into patients, waste[] precious resources, and
31
cause[] iatrogenic harm.”
Despite the growing attention to disease-branding and drugmongering in the public health, sociology-of-health, economic, and
advertising fields, there appears to be a critical abstinence in the legal
realm. There is a dearth of legal literature addressing these practices
as a unique phenomenon or evaluating the regulatory issues and liability implications for the pharmaceutical industry that stem from
32
them. This Comment concedes that opposition to the phenomena
of disease-branding and drug-mongering, which critics of the pharmaceutical industry and of the FDA have expounded, is valid from a
sociology-of-health perspective. But such criticism is inappropriate

28
Ronald W. Pies, FDA Lacks Desire for Flibanserin—but Does Hypoactive Sexual Desire
TIMES
(Aug.
4,
2010),
Disorder
Even
Exist?,
PSYCHIATRIC
http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/sexual-disorders/content/article/10168/1632801.
For a discussion of how the term “disease” is defined, see infra Part III.B.
29
Ray Moynihan & David Henry, The Fight Against Disease Mongering: Generating
Knowledge for Action, 3 PLOS MED. 425, 425 (2006), available at
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.00
30191.
30
Tiefer, supra note 26, at 436.
31
Moynihan & Henry, supra note 29, at 425. An iatrogenic injury is one “induced
inadvertently by a physician or surgeon or by medical treatment or diagnostic procedures.”
Iatrogenic
Definition,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
MED.
DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/iatrogenic (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
32
See Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 241, 242 (1999) (“Little or no attention is paid to the ways in which
medical professionals react to the external pressures emanating from, or mediated
by, legal institutions with regard to defining and diagnosing disease conditions.”). A
LexisNexis search of the “U.S. Law Reviews and Journals, Combined” database reveals zero hits for “drug mongering,” zero hits for “disease branding,” and sixteen
hits for “disease mongering” (the majority of which are simply quoting works by Ray
Moynihan).
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from a regulatory point of view. This Comment argues that the practices of disease-branding and drug-mongering comply with the Food,
33
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FD&C Act”) and its accompanying regula34
tions addressing prescription drug advertising. Because this Comment concludes that critics are unlikely to succeed in challenging
these practices from an administrative-law perspective, it will consider
the viability of a legal cause of action against such practices, using the
common law torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED), negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), and medical malpractice. Upon analyzing these litigation strategies, the
Comment concludes that a claim for IIED, NIED, or medical malpractice could possibly survive a motion to dismiss and could be decided on its merits. Nevertheless, such a claim would be unlikely to
succeed and, if it did, would ultimately be ineffective as a comprehensive reform measure. Accordingly, the most successful and effective route to change these practices on a systemic level is in the legislative arena. Therefore, this Comment considers a previously
introduced congressional bill, the Independent Drug Education and
Outreach Act (IDEA), and proposes and evaluates possible amendments to this bill that would address the negative effects of diseasebranding and drug-mongering practices. Through medical education strategies, such as “academic detailing” of physicians, critics can
combat what they perceive as pervasive and insidious pharmaceutical
promotional practices.
Part II of this Comment examines the historical and legal development of the FDA’s regulatory framework as well as the evolution of
the federal drug approval process and DTC advertising of approved
prescription drugs. Part III discusses the sociology-of-health analytical framework and considers how the social construction and medicalization of disease enables disease-branding and drug-mongering.
Part IV examines potential causes of action that critics can use to
challenge the pharmaceutical industry in the tort arena through
claims for IIED, NIED, and medical malpractice. It then considers
legislative and educational reform efforts as a prospective remedy to
combat the negative effects of disease-branding and drug-mongering.
Part V concludes.

33
34

21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399d (2006).
See generally 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2011) (prescription drug advertisements).
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II. THE HISTORY OF DRUG REGULATION AND THE CURRENT LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
A. Historical Development of the Statutory Definition of a “Drug”
The development of a regulatory framework for approving drugs
35
began in 1906, but the relevant statutory definition of “drug” was
36
first amended in 1938. The legislative history of the FD&C Act re37
veals the evolution of the definition. During the congressional hearings leading up to the 1938 Act, there was growing concern about the
lack of jurisdictional reach. The “definition for the term ‘drug’
fail[ed] to cover drugs invented to alter the structure or function of
38
the body,” as opposed to those “substances intended to be used for
39
the cure, mitigation, or prevention of disease,” to which the 1906
Act definition was limited. The principal way in which the 1938
amendments altered the definition of “drug” was that “[d]rugs intended for diagnosing illness or for remedying underweight or overweight or for otherwise affecting bodily structure or function [were]
40
subjected to regulation.”
The 1938 amendments added §
41
321(g)(3), which defined the structure/function drugs to include
all products “which are sold to correct the function and structure of
the body, such as obesity preparations which were not covered by the
42
act.” The purpose of this broadened and inclusive definition was “to
reach the use of fat reducers, particularly since obesity may not be a
43
disease.”
35

See Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed
1938).
36
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 201(g),
52 Stat. 1040, 1041 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2006)).
37
See generally LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG & COSMETIC ACT
AND ITS AMENDMENTS (1979) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY FD&C ACT].
38
81 CONG. REC. 1947 (1937) (statement of Rep. Edward H. Rees), reprinted in 5
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY FD&C ACT, supra note 37, at 816, 816.
39
§ 7, 34 Stat. at 769.
40
S. REP. NO. 75-2139, at 2 (1938), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FD&C
ACT, supra note 37, at 300, 301.
41
§ 201(g), 52 Stat. at 1041 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2006)).
42
Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics: Hearings on S. 5 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on
Commerce, 74th Cong. 29 (1935) (statement of Charles Wesley Dunn), reprinted in 3
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY FD&C ACT, supra note 37, at 192, 224. At this hearing, Mr.
Dunn was representing the Associated Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc., the
American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, the National Association of
Dog Food Manufacturers, and himself.
43
Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics: Hearings on H.R. 6906, H.R. 8805, H.R. 8941 and S. 5
Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong. 55
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One should consider the FDA’s regulatory capacity over obesity
drugs in order to analyze how “structure/function” drugs became
subject to FDA regulation. Prior to 1938, obesity drugs were outside
the FDA’s jurisdictional scope, but now, especially within the past
couple of years, the FDA has taken several decisive regulatory actions
with respect to obesity drugs. On October 8, 2010, Abbott Labs with44
drew the diet drug Meridia from the market. A week later, the FDA
“declined to approve what would have been the first new prescription
45
diet pill in more than a decade.” Shortly thereafter, the FDA reject46
ed another diet pill, called Qnexa. Dr. Ken Fujioka, Director of the
Center for Weight Management at the Scripps Clinic in San Diego,
commented how “[i]t looks pretty bleak out there for anyone trying
47
to get a drug approval for weight loss.”
This observation would have seemed absurd to any drug manufacturer prior to the 1938 Act, which expanded the definition of drug
to include structure/function drugs specifically in order to place obe48
sity drugs within its regulatory jurisdiction. Prior to 1938, obesity
was not considered a disease and obesity drugs could only be regulated through FDA’s enforcement authority over adulteration and mis-

(1935) (statement of Walter G. Campbell, Chief, Food and Drug Administration)
[hereinafter Food, Drug, and Cosmetics], reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY FD&C ACT,
supra note 37, at 312, 370; cf. Annemarie Jutel, Sociology of Diagnosis, A Preliminary Review, 31 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 278, 292 (2009) (“Commercial interests have an important stake in highlighting overweight as a medical diagnosis, rather than a statistical deviation from normative weight.”).
44
Andrew Pollack, Abbott Labs Withdraws Meridia from the Market, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
9, 2010, at B3.
45
Andrew Pollack, No F.D.A. Approval for New Diet Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at
A27; see also Andrew Pollack, F.D.A Panel Urges Denial of Diet Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
2010, at B1 [hereinafter Pollack, F.D.A. Panel Urges]. An FDA advisory panel
recommended against approval of a new diet pill, the latest setback in
efforts to develop treatments for the nation’s obesity epidemic . . . .
The negative vote is the second setback this year in attempts to win approval for what would be the first new prescription weight-loss drug in
more than a decade.
Pollack, F.D.A. Panel Urges, supra.
46
Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Rejects Qnexa, a Third Weight-Loss Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
29, 2010, at A1.
47
Id. But see Andrew Pollack, Advisory Panel Favors Approval for Weight-Loss Drug,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2012, at B1 (noting that the advisory committee recommended
approval of Qnexa and that the FDA is expected to decide whether to approve the
drug by April 17, 2012).
48
See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
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49

branding; now, because approval is required, the FDA has taken
regulatory action on three obesity drugs in a single month, and obesi50
ty is considered not only a disease, but an epidemic.
A drug is now defined as any article intended to diagnose, cure,
mitigate, treat, or prevent disease (“disease drug”) or any article intended to affect the structure or function of the body (“struc51
ture/function drug”). The addition of structure/function drugs into the regulatory scheme is relevant for the discussion of diseasebranding because it rebuts the critics’ argument that the FDA ap52
proves drugs to treat non-diseases or industry-invented ailments.
B. Regulatory Classification and Approval of a Drug
Drugs are classified as either “new drugs” or drugs that are “gen53
erally recognized as safe and effective” (GRASE). Before a new drug
can be marketed, the FDA requires approval of an NDA under 21
U.S.C. § 355(b)(1), of an Abbreviated New Drug Application under
21 U.S.C. § 355(j), or through the hybrid 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) pro54
cess. GRASE drugs can be marketed without these approvals if they
55
comply with an over-the-counter (OTC) drug monograph. Whether
drugs are “disease drugs” or “structure/function drugs” is largely irrelevant for regulatory purposes because both must be safe and effec-

49

For a discussion of how the FD&C Act’s definition of drug was amended because obesity was not considered a disease, and thus articles intended to remedy obesity escaped classification and regulation, see Nutrilab, Inc. v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d
335 (7th Cir. 1983). For a suggestion that obesity is not a disease, see Food, Drug, and
Cosmetics, supra note 43, at 370.
50
Benjamin Caballero, The Global Epidemic of Obesity: An Overview, 29
REV.
1,
1
(2007),
available
at
EPIDEMIOLOGIC
http://epirev.oxfordjournals.org/content/29/1/1.full.pdf.
51
21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B)–(C) (2006) (“[A drug includes] articles intended for
use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or
other animals; and articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any
function of the body of man or other animals . . . .” (emphasis added)).
52
See infra Part II.B (discussing that the safety-and-efficacy standard of approval is
the same for all new drugs).
53
§ 321(p)(1)(“[New drug is a]ny drug . . . the composition of which is such that
such drug is not generally recognized, among experts qualified . . . to evaluate the safety
and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use under the condition prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof . . . .” (emphasis added)).
54
Id. § 355(a).
55
21 C.F.R. § 330.1 (2011) (“[An OTC drug] is generally recognized as safe and
effective and is not misbranded if it meets . . . each of the conditions contained in
any applicable monograph.”). Although there are three routes to market for new
drugs, this Comment will focus on brand name drugs that require an NDA.
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56

tive for their intended use. But whether the drug’s intended use involves the treatment of certain diseases is relevant because “the status
of a health condition as a disease potentially affects a number of [the
57
FDA’s] regulatory decisions.” For example, the FDA gives accelerated approval for certain fast-track products that are “intended for the
58
treatment of a serious or life-threatening condition,” priority review
59
status for new drugs that treat tropical diseases, and orphan drug
60
status, which includes licensing incentives, to products intended for
61
the treatment of rare diseases. Outside of these specific provisions,
however, classifying drugs into disease drugs or structure/function
drugs is largely irrelevant because the regulatory approval process is
the same. Although the concept of “disease” has important applications in federal drug regulation, it is only relevant to the initial ap62
proval. The FDA’s regulation of the subsequent advertising and
promotional practices does not consider, nor do the agency’s regulators monitor, the status of the disease, as long as the advertisement is
not misleading and the drug remains safe and effective for its intend63
ed use, whatever that use may be.
The FDA’s decision to approve a new drug “entail[s] a riskbenefit calculation, so the perceived importance of the therapeutic
64
benefit naturally will influence the Agency’s licensing judgments.”
Although this observation may be important for the initial approval
process, once the drug is approved and marketed, categorizing products as disease or structure/function drugs sets up a false dichotomy

56
Compare § 355(a) (safety and efficacy requirement for new drugs), with § 330.10
(safety-and-efficacy requirement for OTC drugs).
57
Noah, supra note 32, at 259.
58
21 U.S.C. § 356(a)(1) (2006).
59
Id. § 360n. See generally Health Topics—Tropical Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/topics/tropical_diseases/en/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2012) (“Tropical diseases encompass all diseases that occur solely, or principally, in the tropics. In
practice, the term is often taken to refer to infectious diseases that thrive in hot, humid conditions . . . .”).
60
Id. § 360cc(a)(2) (seven-year exclusive licensing period).
61
Id. § 360bb(a)(2).
62
Noah, supra note 32, at 242 (“[The concept of disease] helps to inform . . .
risk-benefit calculations performed by regulatory agencies charged with licensing
therapeutic products . . . .”).
63
See generally 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (2011) (noting that the focus of regulating
direct-to-consumer prescription drug advertisements is not on the disease but on ensuring that the advertisements “include information relating to the major side effects
and contraindications of the advertised drugs”).
64
Noah, supra note 32, at 261.
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because every drug must comply with the same laws and regulations.
Approval is based on safety and efficacy, and although the riskcalculus might be different for drugs that treat life-threatening diseases as compared to those drugs that treat less dire lifestyle problems, the regulatory approval standard is the same.
An application for FDA approval to market a new drug requires,
in part, a summary with a “statement identifying the pharmacologic
class of the drug and a discussion of the scientific rationale for the
drug, its intended use, and the potential clinical benefits of the drug
65
product.” Once the application is received, the “FDA will approve
an application after it determines that the drug meets the statutory
standards for safety and effectiveness, manufacturing and controls,
66
[and] labeling.” Through the approval of an NDA, the most rigorous procedural mechanism of pharmaceutical regulation, the FDA
acts as a gatekeeper by determining which drugs enter and exit the
67
marketplace. The FDA uses this gate-keeping authority to approve a
68
drug company’s NDA and regulate the flow of drugs to the market.
For example, consider Nuedexta, a drug that was recently ap69
proved to treat pseudobulbar affect (PBA), a condition “characterized by involuntary, sudden, and frequent episodes of laughing
and/or crying . . . [which] typically occur out of proportion or in70
congruent to the underlying emotional state.” Critics of diseasebranding may question whether episodes of laughing and crying constitute a disease—that is, whether PBA is an industry-invented disease
that the drug sponsor created in order to provide the FDA with a jurisdictional hook under § 321(g)(1)(B) and thus approve Nuedexta
as a “disease” drug. PBA, however, is classified in the International
Classification of Diseases as “[o]ther specified nonpsychotic mental
65

21 C.F.R. § 314.50(c)(2)(ii) (2011); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006).
Id. § 314.105(c); see also § 355(d).
67
See Daniel Carpenter, Reputation, Gatekeeping, and the Politics of Post-Marketing
Drug Regulation, 8 VIRTUAL MENTOR: AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 403, 404 (2006), available at http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2006/06/pdf/pfor1-0606.pdf.
68
See Daniel Carpenter, The Political Economy of FDA Drug Review: Processing, Politics, and Lessons for Policy, 23 HEALTH AFF. 52, 52 (2004), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/23/1/52.full.pdf+html.
69
Letter from Russell Katz, Dir., Div. of Neurology Prods., Office of Drug Evaluation I, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to Randall Kaye, Vice President, Clinical
&
Med.
Affairs,
Avanir
Pharm.
(Oct.
29,
2010),
available
at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2010/021879s000ltr.pdf .
70
NUEDEXTA, FULL PRESCRIBING INFORMATION 3 (2010) [hereinafter, NUEDEXTA],
available at http://www.nuedexta.com/NUEDEXTA_Full_Prescribing_Information1.pdf.
66
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disorders following organic brain damage.” In other words, PBA accompanies serious disease states, such as amyotrophic lateral sclerosis
72
or multiple sclerosis, and Nuedexta treats specific functions of the
body, the abnormality of which constitutes symptoms of these diseas73
es. Thus, although distinctions between disease drugs and structure/function drugs may be nebulous and overlapping, the status of
the drug as one intending to treat diseases or affect bodily structures/functions is legally irrelevant because both classifications of
74
drugs require proof of safety and efficacy prior to approval.
C. DTC Advertising
75

Once a drug and its labeling are approved, the drug sponsor
can promote the drug and legally use DTC advertising as part of a
76
comprehensive marketing and promotional strategy. The distinct—
yet occasionally overlapping—regulatory roles of the FDA and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the marketing and advertising
of approved drugs are important to consider. Based on the FTC-FDA
77
Memorandum of Understanding, the FDA has jurisdiction over DTC
78
advertising of prescription drugs. The FDA’s rules and regulations
control the industry, and the FDA’s Office of Prescription Drug Pro-

71
Diseases Tabular List and Index, INT’L CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES-9-CM,
http://www.icd9cm.net/ (search “Search Diseases” for “Pseudobulbar affect”; then
follow “Pseudobulbar affect (PBA) 310.8” hyperlink) (last updated Apr. 9, 2011).
72
See NUEDEXTA, supra note 70, at 3.
73
Id.
74
The same analysis applies to obesity drugs, which affect the structure/function
of the body, but also treat a disease (assuming that obesity is properly classified as a
disease).
75
See 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2006) (definition of labeling); id. § 355(b)(1)(F) (labeling included in NDA).
76
See generally 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e) (2011) (describing prescription drug advertisements broadcasted through television).
77
FDA-FTC Memorandum of Understanding, 36 Fed. Reg. 18539 (Sept. 16,
1971). See generally Thomas B. Leary, The Ongoing Dialogue Between the Food and Drug
Administration and the Federal Trade Commission, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 209 (2004) (describing the different roles of the FDA and FTC in regulating drug labeling and advertisements, specifically in reference to DTC advertising of prescription drugs).
78
FDA-FTC Memorandum of Understanding, 36 Fed, Reg. at 18539 (“The Food
and Drug Administration has primary responsibility with respect to the regulation of
the truth or falsity of prescription drug advertising.” (emphasis added)). A drug is classified as a prescription (Rx) drug if “because of its toxicity or other potentiality for
harmful effect, or the method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its
use, is not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law
to administer such drug.” 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(A) (2006).
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motion (OPDP), formerly the Division of Drug Marketing, Advertis79
ing and Communications, enforces the laws.
A prescription drug DTC advertisement must present a fair bal80
ance between risks and benefits and will be deemed misbranded unless it contains a “major statement” describing side effects and contra81
indications. In addition, sponsors of DTC broadcast advertisements
are required to present a brief summary of the necessary side effects
and contraindications or, alternatively, may make an “adequate provision . . . for dissemination of the approved . . . labeling in connection
82
with the broadcast presentation.”
In order to understand how these regulations govern diseasebranding and drug-mongering one must examine the FDA’s current
interpretation of rules governing DTC broadcast advertising. In August 1999, the FDA issued a final guidance entitled Guidance for Industry: Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements (“Guidance”), which
broadened the scope of permissible DTC advertising of pharmaceuti-

79

The Office of Prescription Drug Promotion (OPDP), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacc
o/CDER/ucm090142.htm (last updated Jan. 5, 2012).
80
Drug Advertising: A Glossary of Terms, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/PrescriptionDrugAdvertis
ing/ucm072025.htm# (last visited Jan. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Drug Advertising: A Glossary of Terms] (“[Product-claim ads must] give a ‘fair balance’ of information about
drug risks as compared with information about drug benefits. This means that the
content and presentation of a drug’s most important risks must be reasonably similar
to the content and presentation of its benefits.”).
81
See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2006).
In the case of an advertisement for a drug subject to section 503(b)(1)
[prescription drug status] presented directly to consumers in television
or radio format and stating the name of the drug and its conditions of
use, the major statement relating to side effects and contraindications
shall be presented in a clear, conspicuous, and neutral matter.
Id.; see also Drug Advertising: A Glossary of Terms, supra note 80 (defining “major statement”).
82
21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (2011).
Advertisements broadcast through media such as radio, television, or
telephone communications systems shall include information relating
to the major side effects and contraindications of the advertised drugs
in the audio or audio and visual parts of the presentation and unless
adequate provision is made for dissemination of the approved or permitted package labeling in connection with the broadcast presentation
shall contain a brief summary of all necessary information related to
side effects and contraindications.
Id.

CETEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

658

5/14/2012 2:29 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:643

83

cal products to consumers. In the Guidance, the FDA expanded the
scope of acceptable advertising practices by allowing for an alternative method of complying with the brief summary requirement in 21
84
C.F.R. § 201(e)(1). The FDA concluded that the major statement of
side effects, coupled with the adequate provision for disseminating
approved labeling, “can provide the information disclosure required
85
for [DTC] broadcast advertisements.”
The Guidance explains different approaches that satisfy the ade86
quate-provision requirement. These approaches include telling patients that physicians can provide more information, disclosing a
website that provides access to the package labeling, and explaining
the location of a concurrent print advertisement appearing in a pub87
lication. Applying OPDP rules and regulations to DTC advertising
suggests that the drugs are not misbranded in violation of the FD&C
Act because the advertisements contain a major statement with adequate provisions; therefore, the disease-branding and drugmongering promotional strategies are fully compliant with the FD&C
Act.
For example, a Zelnorm DTC advertisement contains the following major statement: “You should not take Zelnorm if you have a history of diarrhea, kidney, liver, or gall bladder disease, intestinal
blockage or adhesions. Tell your doctor if you get diarrhea or cramp88
ing, worsening of abdominal pain, dizziness, or headache.” The adequate provision is the statement on the bottom of the screen: “See
89
our ad in SHAPE magazine.” A Toviaz DTC advertisement contains
the following major statement: “If you have certain stomach problems
or glaucoma or cannot empty your bladder you should not take
Toviaz. Toviaz can cause blurred vision and drowsiness so use caution when driving or doing unsafe tasks. The most common side ef-

83

See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY—CONSUMER-DIRECTED
BROADCAST
ADVERTISEMENTS
(1999),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation
/Guidances/ucm070065.pdf.
84
Bernard J. Garbutt III & Melinda E. Hofmann, Recent Developments in Pharmaceutical Products Liability Law: Failure to Warn, the Learned Intermediary Defense, and Other
Issues in the New Millennium, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 269, 274 (2003).
85
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., supra note 83, at 3.
86
Id. at 2–3.
87
Id.
88
Zelnorm TV Ad (2003), YOUTUBE (Aug. 8, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=81IVMc5EfN0&feature=related [hereinafter Zelnorm TV Ad (2003)].
89
Id.
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fects are dry mouth and constipation.”
The adequate provision
91
states: “See our ad in Cooking Light.” In addition, a Latisse advertisement includes the following:
If you are using prescription products for lowering eye pressure . . . only use Latisse under close doctor care. May cause eyelid skin darkening which may be reversible and there is potential
for increased brown iris pigmentation which is likely permanent . . . . Common side effects include itchy eyes and eye red92
ness.

The adequate provision includes a website, a telephone number, and
the following statement at the bottom of the screen: “See our ad in
93
Allure magazine.”
This is not to say that all DTC broadcast advertising is legal per
se. There are countless examples (beginning with the first ever DTC
advertisement) of the FDA taking regulatory actions against pharmaceutical companies because of false and misleading promotional ma94
terials. In addition, the FDA has required corrective action for DTC
broadcast advertisements that violate the balance requirement, for
example, when an advertisement overstates benefits, expands intend95
ed uses, or minimizes side effects. Nevertheless, individual instances
of misleading advertisements represent mere isolated tactical mistakes
by drug companies because disease-branding and drug-mongering, as
90
CR AdWatch: Toviaz, CONSUMER REP., http://bcove.me/3232jaew (last visited
Feb. 4, 2012) [hereinafter CR AdWatch: Toviaz].
91
Id.
92
Latisse
Brooke
Shields
Commercial,
YOUTUBE
(July
15,
2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VqRyv8abWR4 [hereinafter Latisse Brooke Shields
Commercial].
93
Id.
94
See, e.g., Letter from Tracy L. Acker, Regulatory Review Officer, Div. of Drug
Mktg., Adver., and Commc’n, Food and Drug Admin., to Sam Boddapati, Dir., Regulatory
Affairs,
SuperGen,
Inc.
(Jan.
6,
1997),
available
athttp://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformati
on/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPhar
maceuticalCompanies/UCM169185.pdf.
95
See, e.g., Yaz FDA Required “Clear Up,” YOUTUBE (Feb. 26, 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EO-G8O0lHq0 (Bayer’s corrective advertisement
for Yaz made pursuant to the Warning Letter from Thomas Abrams, Dir., Div. of
Drug Mktg., Adver., & Commc’n, to Reinhard Franzen, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Bayer HealthCare Pharm., Inc. 1 (Oct. 3, 2008), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation
/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharm
aceuticalCompanies/ucm053993.pdf (“The TV Ads are misleading because they
broaden the drug’s indication, overstate the efficacy of YAZ, and minimize serious
risks associated with the use of the drug.”)).
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a holistic, comprehensive promotional strategy, are legal from a regulatory perspective.
Furthermore, the focus on the major statement to achieve com96
pliance only applies to product-claim ads. Reminder ads, which call
97
attention to a brand name drug but do not include indicated uses,
and help-seeking ads or disease-awareness ads, which describe a dis98
ease but do not recommend a specific drug, are exempt from the
99
provisions that require a major statement about side effects. These
types of ads are relevant for this Comment’s later discussion about
100
how DTC advertising enables disease-branding.
III. THE MEDICALIZATION AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DISEASE
The phenomena of disease medicalization and the social construction of disease provide the background and theoretical frame101
work for analyzing disease-branding and drug-mongering strategies.
This framework provides a better understanding of the diseasebranding and drug-mongering strategies that the pharmaceutical industry employs because once a company defines the disease—and
treatment of the disease in terms of the drug’s intended use—the
102
drug can be legally marketed in the form of DTC advertising.
Accordingly, a crucial initial inquiry is what is the definition of disease
for the purpose of DTC advertising?
A. Defining Disease
One medical dictionary defines “disease” as “any deviation from
or interruption of the normal structure or function of any part, organ, or system (or combination thereof) of the body that is manifested by a characteristic set of symptoms and signs and whose etiology,
96
See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1)(2011); Basics of Drug Ads, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/PrescriptionDrugAdvertis
ing/ucm072077.htm (last updated June 24, 2009) [hereinafter Basics of Drug Ads].
See generally Prescription Drug Advertising, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/PrescriptionDrugAdvertis
ing/default.htm (last updated May 26, 2011) (presenting examples of the different
types of prescription drug advertisements).
97
§ 202.1(e)(2)(i).
98
Basics of Drug Ads, supra note 96.
99
See id.; § 202.1(e)(2)(i).
100
See infra Part IV.B.1.c (illustrating the strategies used by various DTC drug advertisements).
101
See infra Part III.B.
102
See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
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pathology, and prognosis may be known or unknown.” A legal dictionary defines “disease” as “a deviation from the healthy and normal
104
functioning of the body.”
But, “it may be absurd to decide on a
concept of disease . . . [because] [t]here will always be ‘normal’ peo105
ple who will want treatment and ‘sick’ people who will refuse it.”
106
Ultimately, the concept of disease appears to be malleable, and the
definition can change through social forces and marketing cam107
paigns.
That the definition is imprecise has been confirmed
through empirical study:
In 1979, a study conducted by a group of Canadian researchers
sought a unifying definition of “disease” by asking doctors to classify 34 different conditions as diseases or non-diseases. . . . The
study concluded with the observation . . . [that] “there is no gen108
eral agreement on the definition of ‘a disease.’”

This Comment uses “disease” to refer to the term that the FDA
interprets in the FD&C Act, but explains that its medico-legal definition is ambiguous and thus susceptible to exploitation by pharmaceutical marketing. Using the sociology-of-health framework, this Comment exposes, explains, and clarifies the medico-legal implications of
defining drugs and disease without reshaping the contours of the
FD&C Act definition. That the disease concept is malleable is significant, not necessarily from a regulatory-approval perspective, but for
the purposes of DTC advertising. Because there is no precise definition, drug companies have capitalized on this ambiguity to create dis109
eases for marketing and promotional purposes. Revealing this malleability clarifies the FDA’s purpose in this area—regulating the safety
and efficacy of drugs, not the authenticity of diseases—and provides a

103
Noah, supra note 32, at 244 (quoting DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 481 (27th ed. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 535 (9th ed. 2009).
105
P.R. Shankar & P. Subish, Disease Mongering, 48 SING. MED. J. 275, 277 (2007).
106
Noah, supra note 32, at 243 (“[S]cholars and physicians alike have recognized
that diseases are socially constructed and mutable.”).
107
See, e,g., infra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing how FSD became
HSDD).
108
Eric J. Gouvin, Drunk Driving and the Alcoholic Offender: A New Approach to an Old
Problem, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 99, 104–05 (1986) (quoting E.J.M. Cambell et al., The
Concept of Disease, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 757, 757 (1979)).
109
See, e.g., Marc Kaufman, Hormone Replacement Gets New Scrutiny: Finding of Increased Risks Prompts Federal Effort, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2002, at A1 (“[F]ederal officials want to explore whether hormone therapies and their producers have encouraged women to believe menopause is a condition to be treated, rather than an inevitable and natural set of changes to be managed.”).
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framework for analyzing DTC promotional practices based on intended use.
B. The Medicalization of Disease
Medicalization is the process “through which aspects of life previously outside the jurisdiction of medicine come to be construed as
110
medical problems.” The sociology-of-health framework of medicalization explains that medicine is “understood as a social and cultural
enterprise as well as a medico-scientific one,” such that disease is defined through socio-cultural forces, rather than clear scientific con111
sensus.
Essentially, disease is a social construction: “In examining
the social meaning of illness, we focus on the role of social and cul112
tural values that shape the perception of a disease or malady.” The
medicalization of disease is the underlying theoretical framework
through which one can analyze how disease-branding and drugmongering occur in practice. Accordingly, the medicalization concept elucidates why and how the definition of disease is malleable
and how it is both outside the scope of the FDA’s jurisdiction and
ripe for pharmaceutical promotional exploitation.
The study of medicalization does not belong solely to the sociology-of-health realm because nosology—the branch of medicine concerned with the classification and description of known diseases—has
a particular and significant application in the law. One commentator, Professor of Law Lars Noah, has noted that “no one has systematically assessed the role that the law plays in the diagnostic enterprise . . . [but that] the law and lawyers have played a subtle, but often
113
significant, role in ‘framing’ disease.”
The way that diseases are
framed or defined in the socio-cultural milieu and later accepted in
the mainstream impacts the regulatory status of drugs used to treat

110

Adele E. Clarke et al., Biomedicalization: Technoscientific Transformations of Health,
Illness, and U.S. Biomedicine, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH & ILLNESS: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES 442, 442 (Peter Conrad ed., 2005); see also Shankar & Subish, supra note
105, at 275 (“Medicalisation is the process of turning ordinary life events and its customary ups and downs into medical conditions.”).
111
Clarke et al., supra note 110, at 443.
112
Peter Conrad, The Social and Cultural Meanings of Illness, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF
HEALTH & ILLNESS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 110, at 104, 104.
113
Noah, supra note 32, at 252 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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these diseases as well as how pharmaceutical companies create adver114
tising campaigns.
Sociologists have explained that “recognizing that drugs are
concrete material objects does not prevent their simultaneous analy115
sis as complex social phenomena.”
The “illness identity” concept
helps explain how this social phenomenon emerges: “[A]n illness
identity refers to an understanding of self, and affiliation with others,
116
on the basis of shared experiences of symptoms and suffering.”
The illness identity subsequently becomes associated with particular
117
pharmaceutical treatments.
For example, consider how menopause, which used to be described as “a natural life event for women,
became defined as a ‘deficiency disease’ in the 1960s when medical
118
therapy became readily available to treat it.”
The concept of disease, and its impact on promoted drug treatments, is malleable especially as medicines become “increasingly
available for conditions which have so far been regarded as the natural result of ageing or as a part of the normal range of human emo119
tions.”
Thus, “although biological and clinical factors have set
boundaries for which symptoms might plausibly be linked in a disease
concept, social influences have largely determined which symptom
120
clusters have become diseases.”
The pharmaceutical industry and
marketing firms have played an important role in perpetuating this
process: “Sadness, or sexual problems, both arguably non-medical in
nature, but variably transformed by the diagnostic labels ‘depression’
114
See, e.g., Ed Silverman, Disease Mongering? The Selling of Fibromyalgia, PHARMALOT
BLOG (Jan. 14, 2008, 7:50 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2008/01/diseasemongering-the-selling-of-fibromyalgia/ (describing the case of fibromyalgia).
115
David Cohen et al., Medications and the Pharmaceutical Industry, in THE
SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH & ILLNESS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 110, at 275, 278.
116
Kristin Barker, Self-Help Literature and the Making of an Illness Identity: The Case of
Fibromyalgia Syndrome (FMS), in THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH & ILLNESS: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 110, at 133, 135.
117
See, e.g., “Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope” PSA by the NFA, YOUTUBE (Sept. 12,
2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SMCECMsW1RE&feature=related [hereinafter Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope] (the public service announcement by the
National Fibromyalgia Association, co-sponsored by Pfizer, the maker of Lyrica, the
first FDA-approved treatment for fibromyalgia).
118
Conrad, supra note 112, at 105; see also Kaufman, supra note 109 (“[F]ederal
officials want to explore whether hormone therapies and their producers have encouraged women to believe menopause is a condition to be treated, rather than an
inevitable and natural set of changes to be managed.”).
119
Shankar & Subish, supra note 105, at 276.
120
Jutel, supra note 43, at 281 (quoting R. Aronowitz, When Do Symptoms Become a
Disease?, 134 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 9, pt. 2, 803 (2001)).

CETEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

664

5/14/2012 2:29 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:643

and ‘erectile dysfunction’, both of which trigger an army of
121
medicalised actions, therapies and processes.”
Fibromyalgia, or fibromyalgia syndrome (FMS)—“a chronic disorder characterized by widespread pain, tenderness, and stiffness of
muscles . . . that is typically accompanied by fatigue, headache, and
122
sleep disturbances” —is a classic example of the social construction
123
of disease. While medical accounts of patients suffering from symptoms associated with this illness have existed for hundreds of years,
the actual disease “has existed as a specific diagnosis only since the
124
mid-1970s.” FMS is a controversial pain disorder because “there is
125
no commonly accepted medical or organic explanation.” FMS is a
“contested illness” because many people suffer from it, but physicians
126
“tend to be skeptical about its organic origin.”
Some doctors who
do not consider FMS a medically diagnosable disease suggest that
“diagnosing the condition actually worsens suffering by causing pa127
tients to obsess over aches that other people simply tolerate.”
In
fact, Dr. Frederick Wolfe, the lead author of the seminal paper that
first defined the diagnostic criteria for FMS, is “cynical and discouraged about the diagnosis . . . [and] now considers the condition a
physical response to stress, depression, and economic and social anx128
iety.”
He explained that “[s]ome of us in those days thought that
we had actually identified a disease, which this clearly is not . . . . To
129
make people ill, to give them an illness, was the wrong thing.” The
New York Times reported, however, that “[d]octors who specialize in
treating [FMS] say that the disorder is undertreated and that its suf130
ferers have been stigmatized as chronic complainers.” Accordingly,

121

Id. at 285.
Fibromyalgia
Definition,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
MED.
DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/fibromyalgia (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
123
Barker, supra note 116, at 133.
124
Id. at 133–34.
125
Peter Conrad, The Experience of Illness, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH & ILLNESS:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 110, at 130, 130.
126
Id.
127
Alex Berenson, Drug Approved. Is Disease Real? N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/14/health/14pain.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
122
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disease-branding reduces the stigma associated with this condition
131
and helps legitimize it as a medical condition.
The most prominent reason for the FMS controversy is its “biomedical invisibility” because there are neither objective indicators nor
132
diagnostic tests for the disease. Although “the American College of
Rheumatology established criteria for the classification of FMS in
133
1990,” there is still no specific and conclusive diagnostic test, so
134
doctors make a diagnosis by evaluating subjective symptoms. Thus,
the biomedical uncertainty about FMS stands in sharp contrast to
the subjective experiences of individuals diagnosed with FMS. . . .
The outcome of this paradox for many with FMS is that they find
themselves in an epistemological purgatory in which they question their own sanity precisely because of their certainty about the
135
realness of their experience in the face of public doubt.

The “epistemological purgatory” is where pharmaceutical companies
thrive—and where the FDA is properly absent. The FDA’s role in
disease-creation is outside the scope of its legislative mandate; the
Agency only regulates the advertising of drugs, not the authenticity of
diseases. Pharmaceutical companies exploit this opportunity through
their advertising power in order to construct knowledge about the existence and reality of the disease and promote their newly approved
136
drug treatment.
131
The president of the National Fibromyalgia Association proclaimed that “[t]he
day that the F.D.A. approved a drug and we had a public service announcement, my
pain became real to people.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
132
Barker, supra note 116, at 134; see also About Fibromyalgia, NAT’L FIBROMYALGIA
ASS’N, http://www.fmaware.org/PageServerded3.html?pagename=fibromyalgia (last
visited Feb. 4, 2012) (“Unlike a disease, which is a medical condition with a specific
cause or causes and recognizable signs and symptoms, a syndrome is a collection of
signs, symptoms, and medical problems that tend to occur together but are not related to a specific, identifiable cause.” (emphasis added)).
133
Barker, supra note 116, at 134.
134
See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LIVING WITH FIBROMYALGIA, DRUGS APPROVED TO
MANAGE
PAIN
2
(2008),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm107805.pdf.
135
Barker, supra note 116, at 134.
136
See infra Part IV.B.1.c (illustrating the promotional strategies used by various
DTC drug ads). Interestingly, promotional practices can sometimes precede FDA
approval when pharmaceutical companies brand diseases and physicians create new
diagnostic criteria listing symptoms of the disease that the drug will be able to treat.
See Cohen et al., supra note 115, at 277 (“[P]romotion of a drug by its manufacturers
may actually precede the clinical trials . . . . The promotion may involve funding professional committees working on the creation of a new psychiatric diagnostic category listing specific target symptoms, treatment of which the new drug is then expected
to improve.”).
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Furthermore, the history of flibanserin and FSD/HSDD provides
a unique illustration of the interrelationship between medicalization
and the pharmaceutical industry. Flibanserin’s origin is as an unintended side effect of a treatment for an unrelated disease. Essentially, it demonstrates the interplay between research, development, and
marketing tactics as a drug developed for one purpose can be marketed as a treatment for another disease:
Studies of [flibanserin] showed it didn’t work well as an antidepressant but showed that it didn’t appear to damp sexual desire as
some antidepressants do. The FDA said antidepressant
studies
showed flibanserin was superior to placebo and a comparator
drug with respect to a question about “how strong is your sex
drive” on a sexual-experience scale. That finding led Boehringer
Ingelheim to develop the product as a treatment for women with
137
HSDD.

Another crucial observation concerns how the name of the disease
changed from FSD to HSDD. The history of the disease shows that “it
was a convergence of pharmaceutical companies, urologists closely
associated with th[e] industry, and media-savvy sex therapists . . .
which resulted in the creation and promotion of a diagnosis of ‘fe138
male sexual dysfunction.’”
One scholar noted how “[t]he unnoticed shift in 2004 in FSD identity and promotion from female sexual
arousal disorder to hypoactive sexual desire disorder is another hallmark moment in the FSD story, illustrating how the effort to match
139
up some drug with FSD moved freely among symptoms and labels.”
Industry-invented diseases exist and continue to proliferate due
to the pervasive effect of medicalization. Medicalizing normal conditions into treatable diseases is the undercurrent upon which some
prescription drugs drift into the marketplace. Because medicalization is a sociological mechanism, it is outside the FDA’s jurisdiction; it
is an unregulated yet effective instrument within the drug companies’
marketing toolbox.
C. How Drug Companies Advertise: Explaining the Disease-Branding/
Drug-Mongering Strategy
Critics condemn the pharmaceutical industry for its promotional
practices of medicalizing non-disease conditions in order to create

137
138
139

Dooren, FDA Questions, supra note 24.
Jutel, supra note 43, at 292.
Tiefer, supra note 26, at 4.
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140

new markets for drug treatments. Disease-branding turns “ordinary
ailments into medical problems, see[s] mild symptoms as serious,
treat[s] personal problems as medical ones, see[s] risks as diseases,
141
and frame[s] prevalence estimates to increate potential markets.”
Disease-branding convinces healthy people they are sick, while drugmongering convinces these newfound patients that they need
142
drugs.
Havidol is a realistic parody of a disease-branding and drugmongering campaign; although fictitious and satirical, it is nevertheless representative of the promotional practice. Australian artist Justine Cooper created a DTC advertising campaign to promote the fake
drug Havidol to treat the farcical disease Dysphoric Social Attention
143
Consumption Deficit Anxiety Disorder.
According to its website
and prescribing information, Havidol is “the only known medication
144
available for this newly recognized disorder.” The public response
145
to the exhibit has been surprising.
The exhibit, which includes a
mock website and television and print advertisements, is so believable
146
that people think it is an authentic DTC advertising campaign.
A
review of the exhibit describes Havidol as
a frightening approximation of the real thing. Parody gives way
to possibility as Cooper recreates the entire drug marketing process—from the invention of a new disorder (wherein a need is
first found and then the disorder is penned) to the branding pro-

140

E.g., NIKOLAS ROSE, THE POLITICS OF LIFE ITSELF: BIOMEDICINE, POWER, AND
SUBJECTIVITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2 (2007) (“Pharmaceutical companies
have been singled out for particular criticism, accused of selling many new drugs at
inflated prices and with false promises, ignoring potentially dangerous side effects,
and medicalizing nondisease conditions such as baldness or lack of libido to create
new markets in the ruthless pursuit of shareholder value.” (citations omitted)).
141
Shankar & Subish, supra note 105, at 275.
142
Id.
143
Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!, REUTERS, Feb. 16, 2007, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/02/16/us-drug-fake-idUSL165119520070216
[hereinafter Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!].
144
Understanding Havidol, HAVIDOL, http://www.havidol.com/understanding.html
(last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
145
Consumers Fall for Havidol Pharmaceutical Parody that Promotes a Fictitious Anxiety
Disorder, NAT. NEWS.COM (Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.naturalnews.com/021660.html
[hereinafter Consumers Fall for Havidol Parody].
146
Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!, supra note 143; see also Marylyn Do(Oct.
15,
2007),
nahue,
When
Branding
Is
Art,
PHARM. EXEC.
http://pharmexec.findpharma.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=465558
&sk=&date=&&pageID=1 (discussing the trade magazine Pharmaceutical Executive’s
response to the Havidol campaign).
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cess of naming the drug, its pill and logo design, promotional
merchandise, and finally its website, TV and print advertise147
ments.

Cooper, commenting on her exhibit and the “comedic” nature of real drug advertisements, states: “I couldn’t be outrageously spoofy so I
really wanted it to be a more subtle kind of parody that draws you in,
makes you want this thing and then makes you wonder why you want
148
it and maybe where you can get it.”
This strategy for a successful
parody parallels the actual DTC advertising strategy used in pharma149
ceutical promotional practices. Critics of this strategy would reject
the arguably comedic nature of these commercials because the fact
that viewers were persuaded that they have a fake disease and need a
fake drug treatment demonstrates just how easily pharmaceutical
companies can succeed in marketing legitimate, albeit controversial,
150
diseases and drugs.
Dr. Carl Elliot explains that disease-branding works very well in
two situations: (1) “the shameful condition that can be
151
destigmatized” and (2) “a condition that can be plausibly portrayed
152
as under-diagnosed.”
During the process of DTC advertising, dis147

Justine
Cooper,
Havidol,
DANEYAL
MAHMOOD
GALLERY,
http://daneyalmahmood.com/ArtistsPages/Justine/PastExhibitions/JustineHavidol.
html (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
148
Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!, supra note 143.
149
For a description of various drug DTC advertising strategies, see infra Part
IV.B.1.c.
150
For a discussion of the “outrageousness” of DTC advertising, see infra Part
IV.B.1.b. If Havidol were real and provided a safe and effective remedy, then the
FDA should approve it because it is inappropriate paternalism for the FDA to prevent
this drug from entering the market based on the controversy surrounding the existence of the disease. Doctors and patients, in an informative, interactive process,
should determine the utility of the drug for each patient’s individual needs. For discussion of Academic Detailing as a way to strengthen this interactive process, see supra Part IV.C.
151
Elliott, supra note 14.
For instance, when Pharmacia launched Detrol in the late 1990s, the
condition the drug treated was known to doctors as “urge incontinence.” Patients called it “accidentally peeing in my pants” and were
embarrassed to bring it up with their physicians. Pharmacia fixed the
problem by rebranding the condition as “overactive bladder.”
Id.
152
Id.
Branding such a condition assures potential patients that they are part
of a large and credible community of sufferers. For example, in 1999,
the FDA approved the antidepressant Paxil for the treatment of “social
anxiety disorder,” a condition previously known as “shyness.” In order
to convince shy people they had social anxiety disorder, Glax-
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153

eases and drugs become “adjectival.”
A psychological connection
between disease and drug develops when symptoms (e.g., inability to
achieve or maintain an erection or high cholesterol levels) are
medicalized into disease-like states (e.g., erectile dysfunction or hyperlipidemia/hypercholesterolemia) because the disease becomes
synonymous and psychologically associated with the advertised drug
154
treatment (e.g., Viagra or Lipitor).
An inextricable link develops
between the disease and the drug in the minds of consumers when a
branded disease is attached to a brand name drug; it is the essence of
pharmaceutical promotional practices.
Although “consumption of medical and pharmaceutical prod155
ucts is itself shaped by brand images and brand loyalty,” diseasebranding is a distinct concept from advertising the brand of the drug
(i.e., drug-mongering) because disease-branding creates a brand for
the disease itself. Used together, however, they create a truly effective
pharmaceutical promotional campaign as disease-awareness ads become inextricably linked in consumers’ minds with the brand name
156
drug that treats the disease.
Pharmaceutical marketing aimed at destigmatizing conditions so
that people feel comfortable seeking help can promote the public
health; thus, the FDA will allow this form of promotion as long as the
drug continues to be safe and effective and the drug’s DTC advertis-

oSmithKline, the maker of Paxil, hired a PR firm . . . [to] put together
a public awareness campaign called “Imagine being allergic to people.”
Id.
153

SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR AND AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 58 (1989).
See generally Tanuja Singh & Donnavieve Smith, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription
Drug Advertising: A Study of Consumer Attitudes and Behavioral Intentions, 22 J. CONSUMER
MKTG. 369 (2005) (analyzing consumers’ perceptions of DTC drug advertisements
and requests for brand name drugs); Tim Scott et al., Killing Me Softly: Myth in Pharmaceutical Advertising, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 1484 (2004) (examining how drug advertisements use visual and linguistic imagery to create associations between diseases and
products).
155
ROSE, supra note 140, at 30.
156
See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: “HELP-SEEKING”
AND OTHER DISEASE AWARENESS COMMUNICATIONS BY OR ON BEHALF OF DRUG AND
DEVICE
FIRMS
6
(2004),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation
/Guidances/ucm070068.pdf (“Psychology and marketing research suggests that the
greater the perceptual similarity between disease awareness communications and
reminder or product claim promotions . . . the more likely it is that the separate messages contained in the two pieces will be remembered together in memory as one
entity.” (citation omitted)).
154
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ing complies with federal statutes and regulations.
Nevertheless,
although this practice can be positive, it can simultaneously be extremely harmful as it “turns healthy people into patients, wastes pre158
cious resources, and causes iatrogenic harm.”
IV. A CASE STUDY OF LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES FOR
PHARMACEUTICAL PROMOTIONAL PRACTICES
A. The FDA’s Role in Defining Disease and Regulating
Disease-Branding
The FDA’s mandate, according to the FD&C Act and its accompanying legislative history, is to approve drugs that are safe and effec159
tive for their intended use. The role of the FDA vis-á-vis the pharmaceutical industry is to act as a regulatory gate-keeper by
160
determining which drugs enter the market.
The FDA approves a
drug for market if it is safe and effective for its intended use; therefore, it is an inappropriate expansion of its grant of authority for the
FDA to consider the legitimacy of diseases. The FDA is an active gatekeeper and regulator of the pharmaceutical industry, but not a paternalistic agency or a national scientific arbiter of disease classification. The critique that the pharmaceutical industry is economically
exploiting the public by turning Americans into medical consumers
need not concern the FDA as this is beyond its legislative mandate.
Thus, while disease-branding may be a valid critique of the drug industry, it should not implicate the FDA because the Agency regulates
neither diseases nor doctors’ treatment of these diseases. The FDA
approves drugs as safe and effective in order to provide doctors with
an arsenal of treatment options; doctors ultimately make the treatment decision by determining whether a particular patient suffers
161
from a disease and how to best treat that patient.

157

Id. at 3. Disease-awareness communication is not subject to risk-disclosure requirements; however, “in other situations where a supposed disease awareness communication is determined to, by implication, identify a particular drug . . . the communication can be considered labeling or advertising and can therefore be subject to
regulation by FDA.” Id.
158
Moynihan & Henry, supra note 29, at 425.
159
See supra Part II.B.
160
See Carpenter, supra note 67, at 404.
161
See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006) (“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit or
interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer
any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relationship.”).
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The limited scope of the FDA’s role in defining disease depends
on a multifaceted consideration of its legislative mandate—
promoting and protecting the public health—juxtaposed against the
social, political, and medical milieu: what drugs pharmaceutical
companies are developing and for what conditions, what advisory
committees are recommending, and how patient advocacy groups are
responding. As mentioned above, the FDA does play some role in
defining, or legitimizing, diseases because the perception of the dis162
ease may shape the regulatory approval process.
A drug’s riskbenefit calculus is dependent on the FDA’s perception of the disease,
the drug’s intended use, and the treatment population. For example,
the FDA must consider whether a drug cures cancer, baldness, or
shyness and whether these cures have risks, including morbidity and
mortality, because these factors alter the drug’s respective risk-benefit
profiles for approval purposes. An effective cure for a deadly cancer
with potentially lethal side effects has a high efficacy rating, and although the risk of death gives the drug a low safety rating, the overall
risk-benefit profile weighs in favor of approval for a specific patient
population because of the drug’s positive effect on the cancer’s mortality rate. By contrast, an effective baldness or shyness cure that is
associated with a high risk of death may have a high efficacy rating,
but its overall public health benefit of curing these benign conditions
cannot outweigh the high risk of death associated with the treatment.
Thus the risk is probably so high that the overall risk-benefit profile
weighs in favor of rejection. In addition, FDA regulators (the individuals rather than the institutional entity) are social beings who can
be influenced by the medicalization of disease-branding. If they consider the disease more severe than it actually is or are persuaded by
disease-awareness ads and other forms of disease promotion that a
normal condition ought to be treated, they may be more inclined to
give less weight to adverse events associated with a drug intended to
163
treat the industry-invented disease in their risk-benefit calculus.
162

See supra Part II.B (discussing accelerated product review and orphan-drug sta-

tus).
163
For example, Pfizer’s NDA for Viagra convinced the FDA that erectile dysfunction is severe enough and the benefits of Viagra are sufficient to outweigh the risks of
the drug. See Approval Letter from Robert Temple, Dir., Office of Drug Evaluation,
Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to Sandra J. Croak-Brossman, Pfizer Pharms.
Prod. Corp. Ltd. (Mar. 27, 2010), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
drugsatfda_docs/appletter/1998/20895ltr.pdf. But see supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text (explaining that Boehringer Ingelheim could not convince the Advisory Panel that HSDD was sufficiently severe and that the benefits of flibanserin
were great enough, to outweigh the drug’s adverse side effects).
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Regardless of the FDA’s limited purpose in defining diseases for
the approval process, it has no role in regulating disease-branding
strategies beyond ensuring that the advertisements are not false or
164
misleading. Advertisements can shape the public’s perception of a
disease and encourage treatment with a drug, while complying fully
165
with the FD&C Act and its regulations. Because these promotional
practices do not violate the regulatory scheme instituted to prevent
the adulteration and misbranding of drugs, critics of these practices
are left without a viable administrative tool to remedy the problems
that stem from these practices.
B. Legal Remedies: Possible Causes of Action for Disease-Branding and
Drug-Mongering
The determination whether an ailment is a disease is a complex
166
socially constructed process. Although it may have implications for
FDA approval, it should be reiterated that the FDA’s regulatory function in determining what constitutes a drug is purely statutory interpretation and that the Agency’s decision to approve a drug for the
market is based on its evaluation of the safety and efficacy of the
167
drug’s intended use.
Because the disease-branding and drugmongering advertising strategies appear, as a general matter, to be
legal and in compliance with the FD&C Act, it seems that there are
no statutory or regulatory bars to this form of pharmaceutical promotion. If labeling and DTC advertising are legal, an argument that
drug companies are misbranding in violation of the Act will fail.
Thus, if the FDA does not have jurisdiction in this area because
the overall strategy complies with federal drug laws and diseasebranding by Big Pharma continues unabated by regulatory restrictions (provided that the advertisements remain compliant), then
what is left of the critique of disease-branding and drug-mongering?
Because the argument that this practice harms society and public
health is still valid from the sociology-of-health perspective, this
Comment considers whether there are any legal remedies available
for people who suffer injuries as a result of these practices. Relying
164
It seems difficult to prove that disease-branding could be considered misleading in violation of 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(3) because there is justified medical science
supporting the legitimacy of the disease, regardless of any surrounding controversy.
165
See supra Part II.C (describing how DTC broadcast advertising generally complies with the federal regulatory scheme).
166
For a discussion of the social construction of disease, see supra Part III.B.
167
See supra Part II.B (discussing the role of the FDA as a regulatory agency that
approves drugs for market if they are safe and effective for their intended use).
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on the sociology-of-health and medicalization frameworks, critics can
use expert testimony from sociology, consumer-psychology, and medical scholarship to provide evidence that the promotional practices
are tortious. Consequently, it seems that the critics’ only option to
hold pharmaceutical companies liable for the arguably egregious
practices of disease-branding and drug-mongering would be to file a
test case in which a plaintiff with standing sues a drug company in
tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) or negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) or sues his or her doctors
for medical malpractice, which, in a circuitous way, could affect drug
companies’ advertising practices.
It is crucial to note at the outset that the fact that these drugs
have been approved by the FDA does not exempt drug companies
168
from liability.
Because FDA approval does not preempt state-law
tort claims for drugs approved through the NDA process, compliance
with the FD&C Act is not necessarily a safe-harbor or a complete de169
fense to tort claims. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held in Wyeth
v. Levine that brand name drug companies are amenable to suit un170
der state tort law.
Thus, even if drug companies comply with the
rules and regulations for DTC advertising, plaintiffs will not be
preempted from suing them for disease-branding and drugmongering advertising campaigns if these claims fit into state negligence regimes. The following sections analyze potential claims for
IIED, NIED, and medical malpractice.
1.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)
171

Havidol, the brilliant parody of prescription drug advertising,
can act as a hypothetical case study for the possibility of an IIED
172
claim. One article commented how the “media exhibit featuring a
campaign for a fake drug to treat a fictitious illness is causing a stir

168

See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1204 (2009).
Id. at 1191.
170
Id. at 1202 (“In keeping with Congress’ decision not to pre-empt common-law
tort suits, it appears that the FDA traditionally regarded state law as a complementary
form of drug regulation.”). Contra PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011)
(holding that federal drug regulations applicable to generic drugs preempt state tort
claims).
171
See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text.
172
Although Future Pharms, Inc., the manufacturer of Havidol, is not amenable
to a lawsuit because fictitious defendants cannot be served with process, the evidence
that consumers legitimately believe that the invented disease and drug are real reveals consumers’ propensity to be influenced by pharmaceutical advertising.
169
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because some people think the illness is real.”
Another article
asked, “What happens if you create a fake disorder and offer a fake
drug to treat it? You get thousands of people fooled that they might
174
have an invented disease.” If an artist can convince ordinary people
that they have a purely imaginary disease that could be treated with a
fictional drug, then surely an otherwise healthy and reasonable person could be convinced that he or she suffers from an industryinvented disease that can be treated by the pharmaceutical company’s real drug bearing an FDA-stamp-of-approval. Thus, a crucial legal question emerges as to whether this conduct is sufficiently outrageous to support a cause of action.
The tort of IIED may provide a viable cause of action that could
be used to challenge these pharmaceutical promotional practices,
175
and which would not be preempted under Wyeth. IIED is a relative176
ly recent tort, and, although every state recognizes it as an inde177
178
pendent cause of action, the area of law is unsettled.
Even if
courts have yet to recognize an IIED claim premised on disease179
branding and drug-mongering, this does not mean that such a
claim would be precluded, and thus should not deter critics from exploring the possibility of filing a complaint.
There is at least one reported case analyzing an IIED claim that
is premised on a patient watching television, which can be used as a
180
foundation to develop the test case. In Brinkman v. Shiley, Inc., a patient received a heart-valve replacement, and after watching a television program discussing incidents of the valve malfunctioning, expe-

173

Fake Drug, Fake Illness—and People Believe It!, supra note 143.
Consumers Fall for Havidol Parody, supra note 145 (emphasis added).
175
If the test-case plaintiff has not suffered physical injury, IIED would be the only
legal recourse because the other negligence-based torts require physical impact or
injury. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing NIED).
176
Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a
Cause of Action Against the Media, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 469, 472 (2000) (citing State
Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 337 (Cal. 1952)) (showing that
California was the first state to recognize IIED as a cause of action); see also 4 NEIL M.
LEVY ET AL., CALIFORNIA TORTS § 44.01 (2011) (describing how the first California
court to recognize IIED as an independent cause of action viewed the tort as protecting the right to be free from invasions of “emotional and mental tranquility”).
177
Markin, supra note 176, at 472 n.17 (collecting cases).
178
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. c (1965) (“The law is still in a stage
of development, and the ultimate limits of this tort are not yet determined.”).
179
As of March 2012, no reported cases on LexisNexis contain the phrase “disease
branding” or “drug mongering.”
180
Brinkman v. Shiley, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 33 (M.D. Pa. 1989).
174

CETEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

5/14/2012 2:29 PM

COMMENT

675

181

rienced severe emotional distress.
Although the court held that
plaintiff’s emotional distress was related to the show’s content and
182
not to the defective device, this situation is clearly distinguishable
from the test case. The fear associated with watching a television
news show that is not affiliated with a drug company and is intended
to inform the viewer is different from the fear resulting from watching a drug-company-created and sponsored advertising campaign
(which, arguably, is intended to induce a sense of fear or “health anx183
iety” in consumers to persuade viewers to purchase their drugs).
a.

Elements of an IIED Cause of Action

According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the prima facie case
for “outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress” (better
known as IIED) is satisfied when a plaintiff alleges that a defendant,
“by extreme and outrageous conduct[,] intentionally or recklessly causes se184
Recovery is possible for “mental
vere emotional distress to another.”
distress or disturbance . . . even in the absence of physical injury or
185
any other actionable injury.”
First, “[t]he element of moral outrage may well be the critical
186
The plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s conduct
element.”
was extreme, which is satisfied “only if the defendant’s conduct is so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible grounds of decency, that it must be regarded as atrocious
187
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” According to the
Restatement, “the recitation of the facts to an average member of the
community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead
188
him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’” Here, the role of “applied psychology” is imperative because marketing-psychology experts can interpret advertising campaigns and give expert testimony about the causal link between disease-branding and drug-mongering tactics and the

181

Id.
Id. at 35.
183
See infra Part IV.B.1.b (discussing hypochondria and health anxiety).
184
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965) (emphasis added).
185
13 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY—ACTIONS,
DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 55A.02 (2011).
186
Id.
187
Id.; see also John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional
Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 789, 799 (2007) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
46 cmt. d (1965)).
188
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
182
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189

resulting emotional distress. The distress could be characterized as
the psychological manipulation of an otherwise healthy person into
believing that he or she has a disease that is treatable with drugs,
coupled with the iatrogenic harm resulting from this pharmaceutical
treatment that the patient would not have experienced had the patient not been convinced that he or she needed the drug. Moreover,
although consumers would not be shocked to learn that the drug
companies advertise to make a profit, they could be shocked to learn
that the drug companies are inventing diseases and convincing
healthy people that they are sick; this could very well cross the
threshold from persuasive advertising tactics to outrageous marketing
behavior. Accordingly, the quest for profit fails to address or identify
the issue; attention in evaluating the extreme or outrageous conduct,
which is the necessary element of the cause of action, should be focused on the means, not the ends.
Second, in order for conduct to be considered intentional or
reckless, the plaintiff must show that the defendant “intended his
specific conduct and knew or should have known that emotional dis190
tress would likely result.” It is important to note that
[a]ctual intent to cause emotional distress is not necessary, because the willful wrongdoer is charged with the duty of foreseeing
the mental and emotional consequences that would naturally flow
from his or her conduct. If the actor did not undertake the offensive conduct for the purpose of causing the harm received, proof
of the intent of the actor to cause that harm may nevertheless be
implied by evidence of circumstances showing that the conduct
was of a nature that reasonably should have been recognized as
191
likely to cause the harm sustained.

Finally, the emotional distress “must be reasonably foreseeable
and justified under the circumstances, attributing to the plaintiff the
192
sensibility of a reasonable person,” unless the defendant knew or
189

For example, in United States v. 38 Dozen Bottles, More or Less, Labeled in Part
Tryptacin, 114 F. Supp. 461 (D. Minn. 1953), the federal district court judge qualified
two experts in the field of advertising and marketing psychology to testify whether
drugs were misbranded in violation of the FD&C Act. The judge explained that the
witnesses “presented exhaustive analyses of the content of the advertisement and the
effect which it was intended to have upon the prospective purchaser of the drug.” Id.
at 462; accord Applied Psychology in Action: Legal Status of Advertising and Marketing Psychology Experts, 38 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 276, 276 (1954) (discussing the same case).
190
Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974). This was the first time
when the Virginia Supreme Court recognized the cause of action for IIED.
191
13 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 185, § 55A.02 (emphasis added).
192
Id.
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took advantage of plaintiff’s “peculiar susceptibility to emotional dis193
tress.”
Because several cases rely on this standard to evaluate IIED
claims, analyzing them is important to understand how they would
apply in the test case. In a federal case in Pennsylvania, Michtavi v.
United States, the plaintiff was a prisoner who alleged that his fellow
inmates attempted to scam him and, as a result, he suffered from depression, which required treatment with the prescription medication
194
Prozac.
Plaintiff’s IIED claim, based on the Restatement (Second) of
195
Torts’ definition, failed because the court concluded that the plaintiff did not allege any conduct that was sufficiently extreme or outra196
geous. Michtavi is a clear example of the high burden that plaintiffs
must meet in order to successfully bring an action for IIED.
In Estate of Duckett v. Cable News Network, LLLP, a federal court
applying Florida law recognized that conduct involving the use of television broadcasts could rise to the level of extreme and outrageous
197
conduct.
The court noted, however, that a successful claim for
IIED under Florida law is extremely rare, as only ten reported cases
were found in which a judgment was entered for a successful plaintiff
198
and affirmed on appeal. In other words, “a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is one thing, avoiding sum199
mary judgment or prevailing at trial is quite another.” In this case,
defendants CNN and Nancy Grace, the star and moderator of the
193

Id.
No. 4:07-CV-0628, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18926, at *6–8 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4,
2009), aff’d, 345 F. App’x. 727 (3d Cir. 2009).
195
Id. at *20 n.7 (“The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not expressly recognized
a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but has consistently
held that, if this cause of action were recognized, the Restatement would set forth the
minimum elements necessary to state such a claim.”).
196
Id. at *22. But see Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir.
1979) (applying Pennsylvania law and holding that the knowing release of false information that a player was suffering from a fatal disease by a professional football
team’s doctor could constitute outrageous conduct for the purposes of IIED); Johnson v. Caparelli, 625 A.2d 668 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that a priest’s sexual
molestation of an altar boy constituted the same, although the claim was ultimately
rejected on other grounds); Field v. Phila. Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989) (holding that an energy company deliberately venting radioactive steam on an
employee and concealing the extent of exposure constituted the same).
197
No. 5:06-cv-44, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88667, at *21–23 (M.D. Fla. July 31,
2008); see also Brinkman v. Shiley, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 33, 33 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (discussing an IIED claim premised on media broadcasts).
198
Estate of Duckett, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88667, at *14.
199
Id.
194
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Nancy Grace show, recorded a telephone interview with Duckett after
200
her child went missing. The interview was scheduled to be televised
the following day, but hours before the show was to air, Duckett
committed suicide.
After the defendant aired the interview,
Duckett’s parents began suffering from severe and debilitating emo201
tional distress.
The plaintiffs successfully alleged at the pleading
stage that the decision to air the show following their daughter’s suicide was sufficiently extreme and outrageous conduct to state a cause
202
of action for IIED.
In Lamothe v. Russell, a Connecticut state court denied defendant’s motion to strike the complaint for IIED in an employment context when the allegation included disparaging remarks about health
203
problems. The court held that, under Connecticut law, sufficiently
extreme and outrageous conduct had occurred when an employer
constantly belittled the plaintiff by telling her that she had health
204
problems because she was overweight.
Analogously, pharmaceutical companies’ advertising campaigns attempt, in a way, to belittle
healthy consumers by persuading them that they are sick. Although
the Lamothe court distinguished ordinary comments from those made
by people in positions of control, this should not be an obstacle for
the test case plaintiffs because pharmaceutical companies are in a position of power as experts in the field of drug promotion and marketing.
In Elson v. Consolidated Edison, Co., an employer subjected the
employee-plaintiff to eight hours of interrogation, knowing of the
employee’s underlying psychological condition for which he was re205
ceiving treatment. As a result, he suffered mental anguish, and the
court concluded that these facts stated a cause of action for IIED because the conduct complained of could be found to be extreme and
206
outrageous.
Although pharmaceutical and advertising companies
are, or should be, aware of the existence of hypochondria in the general population, it would be impossible to plead with particularity
that a company knew that the specific plaintiff suffered from hypo200

Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *21.
202
Id. at *22–23.
203
No. CV074022729S, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 775, at *15 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Mar. 25, 2009).
204
Id. at *4.
205
641 N.Y.S.2d 294, 294 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
206
Id. at 294–95.
201
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207

chondria and was thus extraordinarily susceptible to suffering extreme emotional distress from disease-branding and drug-mongering.
Therefore, unlike the Elson defendant, pharmaceutical companies
may be able to escape liability because the plaintiff would probably be
unable to prove that the company was aware of the plaintiff’s particu208
lar sensitivities and predilection to mental distress.
Because it is clear that the companies intend to produce a dis209
ease-branding and drug-mongering campaign, the plaintiff can
plead the “specific conduct” necessary for the intentional or reckless210
ness element. Although the companies know that some consumers
would be convinced to seek the advertised drug, the plaintiff would
have to show that the recognition that one might have a newfound
disease is tantamount to experiencing emotional distress. Even
though emotional distress can be a consequence of the self-diagnosis
that accompanies disease-branding, the plaintiff would need to allege
that this was the logical consequence of seeing the campaign. In other words, the plaintiff must allege that a drug company intended or
should have known that emotional distress would likely follow from
viewing the advertisement, rather than merely showing that learning
of a new disease would result in the consumer experiencing emotional distress.
In California, outrageous conduct that is sustained or persistent
and which affects the plaintiff over an extended period of time is
more likely to be considered outrageous than conduct which is short211
lived. In addition, other cases recognize that individual acts may be
insufficient, but the cumulative effect of these acts, when viewed as a
pattern or course of conduct, could rise to the level of outrageous
212
conduct.
Thus, if one looks at disease-branding and drugmongering as a cumulative advertising campaign, rather than count-

207

See infra note 226 and accompany text (discussing hypochondria).
In a class action, however, it might be possible to argue that pharmaceutical
companies and their advertising companies had constructive knowledge of general
rates of hypochondria such that the court could infer that the defendant took advantage of the plaintiffs’ peculiar susceptibility.
209
See, e.g., Landman, supra note 7; Vince Parry, Disease Branding: What Is It, Why it
Works, and How to Do It—A Win-Win Marketing Strategy that Illuminates, Educates, and
EXEC.
(Oct.
1,
2007),
Promotes
at
the
Same
Time,
PHARM.
http://pharmexec.findpharma.com/pharmexec/Supplements/BrandingDisease/Ar
ticleStandard/Article/detail/465561.
210
Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974).
211
LEVY ET AL., supra note 176, § 44.01 & n.55.
212
Id. § 44.01 & n.56.
208
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ing each time a consumer views a commercial as a discrete event, it is
likely to satisfy California’s duration and cumulative-effect standard
for determining whether alleged conduct is outrageous.
In another Pennsylvania case, Rideout v. Hershey Medical Center,
the plaintiffs’ child was diagnosed with a brain tumor, which they
213
wanted to treat aggressively. Due to the child’s deteriorating condition and likely imminent demise, however, the hospital’s Ethics
Committee decided that further treatment would be futile and dis214
connected the child’s ventilator without the parents’ presence. The
parents suffered severe emotional anguish as a result of hearing over
the loudspeaker that the ventilator had been disconnected and sub215
sequently witnessing their daughter’s death.
The hospital argued
that the IIED claim failed because the plaintiffs were not present
when the ventilator was disconnected; however, the court concluded
that “aural and contemporaneous perception of the removal of the
216
ventilator is sufficient to allege presence.” Furthermore, the hospital asserted that its decision to disconnect the ventilator “was a thoroughly reasoned exercise of professional judgment and that accord217
ingly, as a matter of law, it did not act outrageously.”
The court
held that although the hospital’s decision to remove life support may
have been reasonable, the conduct could still be considered extreme
218
and outrageous to support a claim for IIED.
Analogously, in the test case, a plaintiff who views the advertisement on television is “present” in the location where the intentional
conduct occurs precisely because he or she perceives aurally and visually the substance of the commercial. In addition, just like in Estate
of Duckett, the plaintiff can witness the advertisements through broadcast media because there does not seem to be a limiting principle
stating that the conduct must be witnessed live. Moreover, presence
is crucial for advertising success; the defendant pharmaceutical company is not only aware of but intends the plaintiff’s presence in front
of the television so that the plaintiff views the commercial. In addition, despite the ostensible reasonableness of the drug advertising
campaign for the legitimate corporate goals of promoting sales and
increasing profits, a court using the Rideout standard could still con213
214
215
216
217
218

30 Pa. D. & C. 4th 57, 59–60 (C.P. Dauphin 1995).
Id. at 61–63.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 69.
Id.
Id.
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clude that disease-branding and drug-mongering conduct is extreme
and outrageous.
b.

Disease-Branding and Drug-Mongering as “Outrageous
Conduct”

In order to establish the first element, the plaintiff must allege
that disease-branding and drug-mongering constitute outrageous
conduct. The question is whether the medicalization of arguably ordinary behavior into symptoms characterizing a disease (i.e., diseasebranding) and the psychological manipulation of healthy people to
think that they are sick and require pharmaceutical treatment (i.e.,
drug-mongering) are evidence of outrageous conduct. This section
argues that drug-mongering, through DTC advertising campaigns, is
probative of the outrageous conduct required to satisfy a prima facie
case for IIED, despite the fact the advertisements otherwise comply
with the FD&C Act and accompanying regulations.
Although there is some research on the relationship between
219
DTC advertising and consumer perceptions of drugs, consumer
220
221
demand, and physician prescribing patterns, there is no research
on the psychological effects of emotional distress associated with disease-branding and drug-mongering. Nevertheless, this does not
mean that the theory is wrong or that the alleged conduct is not outrageous; it just requires plaintiffs to overcome the pleading burden by
alleging sufficient facts that state a claim for relief that is plausible on
222
its face.
In addition, at least one scholar has evaluated successful IIED
223
claims in the media context. According to Professor Markin’s article, the majority of successful claims resulted from outrageous “news-

219

See Deborah F. Spake & Mathew Joseph, Consumer Opinion and Effectiveness of
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 24 J. CONSUMER MKTG. 283, 283 (2007) (“Limited research has been done on the relationship between consumer perceptions of DTC
advertising and its impact on consumer requests for pharmaceutical products.”).
220
See, e.g., Matthew F. Hollon, Direct-to-Consumer Marketing of Prescription Drugs:
Creating Consumer Demand, 281 JAMA 382 (1999) (discussing the effect of DTC advertising on consumer demand for prescription drugs).
221
See, e.g., W.M. Zachry et al., Relationship Between Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and
Physician Diagnosing and Prescribing, 59 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 42 (2002) (discussing the relationship between DTC advertising and physician diagnoses and prescriptions associated with the advertised products).
222
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (explaining the “plausibility”
standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)).
223
See Markin, supra note 176.
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224

gathering behavior.”
Relevant to the test case, however, are “content” claims where the content of the media message is the outra225
geous conduct.
Although Professor Markin’s article does not discuss any case of pharmaceutical advertising, this does not preclude a
court from concluding that a disease-branding and drug-mongering
allegation entails sufficiently extreme and outrageous conduct for an
IIED claim.
Consider a plaintiff with hypochondria who is subjected to a dis226
ease-branding and drug-mongering advertising campaign.
Hypochondriacs believe that ordinary physical symptoms are signs of more
227
serious diseases.
It is a psychosomatic disorder, which means that
the etiology of the disorder is psychological, but it manifests in physi228
This “health anxiety,” which affects up to twenty
cal symptoms.
percent of the population, is a mental illness in which worrying about
224
Id. at 479 (discussing Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D.
Ohio 1997) (holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that defendantjournalist’s invasion of the plaintiff’s home and the broadcasting of images of her
mother’s dead body was extreme and outrageous conduct)); see also id. at 481 (discussing KOVR-TV v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(“[A] jury could find that a television reporter who attempts deliberately to manipulate the emotions of young children [by recording an interview with the children
about their neighbors’ murder-suicide] . . . has engaged in conduct ‘so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency .
. . .’”)).
225
Id. at 484 (discussing Murray v. Scholosser, 574 A.2d 1339, 1340 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1990) (denying defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff’s complaint of IIED when
radio host “stated, in reference to the photograph of the named plaintiff, that she
was ‘too ugly to even rate,’ in light of her physical attractiveness and sexual desirability, and that she had won the ‘dog of the week’ prize consisting of a case of Ken-LRation and a dog collar”); see also id. at 485 (discussing Armstrong v. H&C
Commc’ns, Inc., 575 So. 2d 280, 282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that an evening news broadcast airing gruesome close-up footage of a murdered child’s skull constitutes outrageous conduct)).
226
Although a hypochondriac may not represent a “reasonable” person, if the defendant-drug company knew of plaintiff’s particular susceptibility to hypochondria,
the company could still be liable. See supra text accompanying note 193. Although it
might be a dispositive defense to prove that the defendant lacked knowledge of a
particular plaintiff’s hypochondria, the availability of the defense does not alter the
viability of the prima facie case at the pleading stage. Thus, although the case may
be resolved in defendant’s favor at the summary judgment stage, the complaint
could initially survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See supra text
accompanying note 199.
227
Hypochondria, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/
article/001236.htm (last updated Jan. 26, 2012); see also DSM-IV-TR, 2000, supra note
3, at 504–07.
228
Hypochondria—Definition,
MAYO
CLINIC,
http://www.mayoclinic.com/
health/hypochondria/DS00841(last updated Nov. 23, 2010).
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potentially getting sick, or confusing minor symptoms for an undiag229
nosed condition, can result in actual physical sickness. The primary
symptom of hypochondria is “intense fear or anxiety about having a
230
serious disease or health condition,” and this fear can result from
“[t]hinking [that one] ha[s] a disease after reading or hearing about
231
it.”
Although such people may realize that they are exaggerating
their symptoms, it is difficult for them to cope, so they seek doctors
and treatment. Accordingly, pharmaceutical companies take advantage of consumers’ propensity for hypochondria by vigorously engaging in disease-branding and drug-mongering and by preying on
their health anxieties.
232
The symptoms of hypochondria are exacerbated by the media,
so an analogy can be drawn to pharmaceutical company’s “diseaseawareness” ads, which implant the idea that potentially minor symptoms represent a major health concern. Disease-awareness or helpseeking ads are a form of disease-branding that “involves using public
awareness campaigns in the media to encourage people to seek new
233
treatments.”
Accordingly, there is a thin line between promoting
knowledge of diseases and the drug-mongering that is associated with
234
branding diseases. As such, disease-branding “is the most insidious
235
of the various forms that medical advertising . . . can take.”
Moreover, the symptoms that ordinarily accompany experiencing stress (e.g., fast heart beat, headache, and gastrointestinal prob236
lems) are readily confused with symptoms of very serious diseases

229

See, e.g., Today Show: Tips to Overcome Your Medical Fears, BING VIDEOS (Oct. 10,
2010),
http://www.bing.com/videos/watch/video/tips-to-overcome-your-medicalfears/6lrdd5r [hereinafter Today Show].
230
Hypochondria—Symptoms, MAYO CLINIC (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.mayoclinic.
com/health/hypochondria/DS00841/DSECTION=symptoms [hereinafter Hypochondria—Symptoms].
231
Id.
232
See id. (“It’s become easier to search out health information on the Internet in
recent years. Having easy access to information about every possible thing that could
be wrong can fuel your anxiety.”); see also Today Show, supra note 229 (“[Hypochondria is] certainly prevalent and of course it gets worse depending on the news. . . ,
[for example,] the skin cancer warnings in the summer and the breast cancer warnings all the time.”)
233
Shankar & Subish, supra note 105, at 275–76.
234
Id. at 277.
235
Wolinsky, supra note 6, at 612.
236
Stress and Anxiety, TIMES HEALTH GUIDE, http://health.nytimes.com/
health/guides/symptoms/stress-and-anxiety/overview.html#Considerations (last updated June 16, 2011).
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such as heart disease, brain tumor, and stomach cancer.
Accordingly, the advertising campaigns that rely on fear mongering to brand
diseases—commercials that are extremely stress-inducing—can worsen a consumer’s ordinary stress levels into a full-blown episode of hypochondria. The purpose of inducing episodes of hypochondria is to
motivate the consumer-patient to self-diagnose and seek the prescription drug to treat the advertised disease. Thus, a crucial component
of disease-branding seems to be the utilization of stress to exacerbate
hypochondria. Because DTC advertising exacerbates hypochondria,
plaintiffs could plausibly allege that drug companies capitalize on
their particular susceptibility through these promotional strategies.
The outrageous act does not only encompass the exploitation of
hypochondriacs; in some cases, the advertisements can be so extreme
that an objectively reasonable person (that is, somebody without hypochondria) could be convinced that he or she suffers from the advertised disease. For example, a reasonable man who experiences rare or occasional sexual problems could be persuaded that he suffers
from the disease of erectile dysfunction (ED) and requires pharmacotherapy. Indeed, Pfizer’s DTC advertising campaign for the ED
drug Viagra was an attempt to “ensure that the drug was seen as legit238
imate therapy for almost any man.”
Because Viagra was never marketed as a niche drug but rather as a treatment for any man with subjective perceptions of sexual insecurities, “[t]he perceived prevalence
239
240
of ED needed to be expanded” in order to broaden the market.
In this regard, the Viagra website explains that “ED is more common
than you think. More than half of men over 40 have some degree of
241
ED.”
This ambiguous statistic focuses on different degrees of ED—
some of which could be considered within the normal range—and
expands the definition by medicalizing slight deviations of normal
237
See Today Show, supra note 229 (“It’s not that [those with health anxiety] don’t
have physical symptoms, it’s that they misinterpret things. Like if their heart skips a
beat it must be heart disease or a routine headache equals brain tumor.”).
238
Joel Lexchin, Bigger and Better: How Pfizer Redefined Erectile Dysfunction, 3 PLOS
MED.
429,
429
(2006),
available
at
http://www.plosmedicine.org/
article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0030132 (emphasis added).
239
Id.
240
See, e.g., Elizabeth Lambdin, Note, A New Disease Born Every Minute: The Marketing of Pathology and the Exploitation of Gender-Based Insecurities and Sexuality to Sell Drugs,
13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 145, 153 (2006).
241
Common Questions—How Can I Tell if It’s Erectile Dysfunction (ED)?, VIAGRA (Aug.
20, 2010), http://www.viagra.com/questions.aspx#/SD_FCP.1.1/2/ (emphasis added).
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242

functioning into a “disease.”
Pfizer’s disease-branding and drugmongering campaign medicalized “rare or transitory failures to
243
achieve or maintain erections” into degrees of ED that could be
treated with a prescription for Viagra. Thus, a reasonable man with a
relatively normal sex life could be convinced, through this DTC
broadcasting campaign, that he has a medical condition requiring
pharmaceutical treatment simply because, for example, his penis was
244
“hard enough for penetration but not completely hard.” The pervasiveness of Viagra’s promotional campaign coupled with the subjec245
tivity of ED symptoms and diagnosis increase the efficacy of—and
intensify the problems associated with—disease-branding and drugmongering, even for reasonable, non-hypochondriacs.
c.

DTC Advertisements: Examples and Analysis

DTC broadcast advertisements follow a distinct, almost boilerplate form, in which a list of vague and common symptoms are described and linked to a disease (the disease-branding part of the advertisement), followed by a discussion of a prescription drug that will
treat this disease and a recommendation to talk to one’s doctor to obtain this drug (the drug-mongering part of the ad). There is a plethora of DTC commercials that utilize this form.
Consider, for example, the Requip commercial for Restless Leg
Syndome (RLS), which exemplifies this formulaic advertising strate246
gy.
It opens with a downward angle shot of a woman; with eerie
music sounding in the background, she looks up into the camera and
247
says: “[I]t was so frustrating, like a mystery I couldn’t solve.” After
listing symptoms of “strange sensations” and linking these symptoms
242

Even the Viagra website recognizes that transient episodes of abnormal functioning constitute ED. Erectile Dysfunction Symptoms, VIAGRA (Aug. 20, 2010),
http://www.viagra.com/about-erectile-dysfunction/erectile-dysfunctionsymptoms.aspx (“[E]rectile dysfunction symptoms can happen just once in a
while.”).
243
Lexchin, supra note 238, at 430.
244
The
Erection
Hardness
Score,
VIAGRA
(Aug.
20,
2010),
http://www.viagra.com/about-erectile-dysfunction/erectile-dysfunctionsymptoms/erection-hardness-score.aspx (“If you’re concerned about your hardness
score, ask your doctor if VIAGRA can help.”).
245
The “ED Test” is Usually Just a Talk, VIAGRA (Aug. 20, 2010),
http://www.viagra.com/about-erectile-dysfunction/ed-test.aspx (stating that the “ED
Test” is usually just a conversation with your physician about your symptoms).
246
Requip,
YOUTUBE
(Jan.
5,
2007),
http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=PL3G1MngqK4.
247
Id.
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to the disease name, the commercial transitions aurally—the eerie
music changes into an ethereal, delicate, and comforting sound as a
doctor discusses a treatment option in the form of a prescription
pharmaceutical.
248
The Zelnorm commercial for Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS)
is also illustrative of the fear-inducement that stems from drug advertising. The voiceover begins by asking, “[A]re you one of the millions
249
who feel twisted and bloated?” Immediately, the commercial destigmatizes and legitimizes the soon-to-be-mentioned disease and
then begins to latch onto consumer health anxiety by exposing the
mystery of the disease: “[I]s your body telling you something is
250
wrong, but you’re not sure why?” The commercial then lists symptoms, “abdominal pain or discomfort, bloating and constipation,” and
suggests that you “see your doctor” because “[y]ou may have a medi251
cal condition called IBS with constipation.” Many people occasion252
ally suffer from IBS symptoms. Thus, not only does this commercial
brand the disease through a litany of common symptoms, but most
importantly, it references a prescription drug that treats the disease
in order to legitimize both the disease and the drug treatment by the
full weight of an FDA approval.
Similarly, the Toviaz commercial for overactive bladder (OAB)
begins with a voiceover: “Erin wants to get up and go without always
253
worrying about where to go.” The emphasis on “worrying” appears
to link the disease symptoms to the stress and anxiety associated with
hypochondria. One could argue that this is an attempt to exploit potential consumers’ psychological predisposition to hypochondria in
order to convince them that they have a disease and then inform
them of the drug that will treat it. Pharmaceutical companies can al248

Zelnorm TV Ad (2003), supra note 88. Although Zelnorm was withdrawn from
the market and Amitiza is currently the only FDA-approved drug to treat IBS, Andrew Pollack, Drug for Irritable Bowel Achieves Goals in Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010,
at B6, the Zelnorm commercial still represents a typical example of the diseasebranding of IBS. Cf. Amitiza Multiple Plus Onstar, YOUTUBE (Apr. 12, 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LsPPwxXVs8w.
249
Zelnorm TV Ad (2003), supra note 88.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
P.D. Higgins & J.F. Johanson, Epidemiology of Constipation in North America: A Systematic Review, 99 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 750 (2004) (“Constipation is very common, as approximately 63 million people in North America meet the Rome II criteria for constipation.”); see also infra note 306 and accompanying text (explaining how
FMS and IBS may be related).
253
CR AdWatch: Toviaz, supra note 90.
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so take advantage of ordinary people’s health anxiety because reasonable consumers (who are not hypochondriacs) who watch these
commercials and identify with the actors’ experience of vague, common, and ordinary symptoms may logically conclude that they also
have the advertised disease. The commercial continues, “[I]f you
have overactive bladder symptoms, today is the day to talk to your doc254
tor and ask about prescription Toviaz.”
By strengthening the disease-drug connection, this marketing campaign generated a new
255
market niche of patient-consumers. Upon visiting the website, one
learns that the primary symptom of OAB, “urgency,” is a medical
condition, rather than a normal bodily function. To reinforce this
notion, the website purposely emphasizes that “[o]veractive bladder
(OAB) is a real medical condition [that is] more common than you may
256
think,” in order to convince the skeptical consumer that the urgent
need to urinate is a treatable medical condition.
In addition, the website explains that
[o]ver 33 million men and women in the United States have
OAB. That’s 1 in 6 adults. So if you think you may have OAB,
you’re not alone. OAB is not necessarily a normal part of aging.
Prevalence increases as you get older. But the truth is that OAB
257
can affect anyone at any age.

Herein lies the psychological manipulation underlying diseasebranding and drug-mongering: the commercial provides a vague explanation of the symptoms (because everybody sometimes has strong
urges to urinate), and immediately links it to a disease (thus legitimizing and medicalizing the symptoms). Then its accompanying website
reinforces the vague symptoms and suggests that the disease is underdiagnosed and can affect anyone at any age. Thus, if you merely
think you have OAB, then it is entirely likely that you do because one
in six adults have it, and if you think you experience these symptoms,

254

Id.
See Anne Landman, Branding Diseases to Sell Cures, PR WATCH BLOG (Oct. 12,
2010, 12:44 PM), http://www.prwatch.org/node/9529 (“By making people think
they have a new condition called ‘overactive bladder,’ the company created a market
of 21 million potential patients.”); John Mack, Overactive Bladder: “Pharmacia Instrumental in Creating New Disease” Says Former VP, PHARMA MKTG. BLOG (Apr. 5, 2009, 8:49
AM),
http://pharmamkting.blogspot.com/2009/04/overactive-bladderpharmacia.html.
256
What Is Overactive Bladder (OAB)?, TOVIAZ, http://www.toviaz.com/overactivebladder.aspx (last updated Nov. 10, 2011).
257
How Common Is OAB?, TOVIAZ, http://www.toviaz.com/how-common-isoveractive-bladder.aspx (last updated Nov. 10, 2011).
255
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you should immediately consult your physician for pharmaceutical
treatment.
The Latisse commercials provide another example of diseasebranding and drug-mongering. The advertisement begins like a typical cosmetic commercial for a new mascara product; however, the ad
quickly medicalizes “inadequate or not enough lashes” into
“hypotrichosis” using a combination of loud, upbeat music and stun258
ning close-ups of eyeshadowed eyes with full lashes. Then, Brooke
Shields enters the screen asking how it is possible to grow lashes; she
proclaims, “I’m using Latisse, the first and only FDA-approved pre259
scription treatment.”
The advertisement ends with Shields saying,
260
“Ask your doctor if Latisse is right for you,” but then suggests to “find
261
a doctor at Latisse.com today.” One might question why one’s regular primary-care physician would not diagnose eyelash hypotrichosis
or prescribe Latisse. It seems clear that this statement is an example
of drug-mongering: instead of discussing the condition or drug with
one’s primary care physician, the advertisement suggests that the
drug’s website will allow one to easily find a doctor, presumably affiliated with the drug sponsor, who is more likely to prescribe the
262
drug.
Searching the website for the “Find a Doctor” link reveals the
following statement: “While any doctor can prescribe LATISSE®,
some may be more familiar with it than others. When making an appointment, be sure to say that you want to find out more about
263
LATISSE®.”
Clearly, the advertising campaign (including the
commercial and the website) is branding the disease, promoting not
just awareness of the condition but the existence and availability of
doctors who will essentially push the drug. The question is whether it
is outrageous conduct to convince the viewer that the viewer has inadequate eyelashes (especially in relation to the eyelash models’ exquisitely long and lush lashes) and is in need of pharmaceutical
treatment. In another version, the commercial ends with Claire
Danes proclaiming that Latisse is “from Allergan, a company with six-

258

Latisse Brooke Shields Commercial, supra note 92.
Id.
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Id.
263
Find a Doctor, LATISSE, http://www.latisse.com/FindaDoctor.aspx?state=18 (last
visited Feb. 4, 2012).
259
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264

ty years of eye-care expertise.” This clearly intends to add legitimacy to the product because the company’s history of eye-care experience should quell any doubts a consumer might have about the company’s ability to manufacture this product.
Critics’ analysis of these commercials is fundamentally flawed.
The Consumer Report AdWatch analyzes the fine-print of the commercial and explains that Latisse is “[f]or inadequate or not enough
265
lashes, also known as hypotrichosis.” The report states, “[I]n order
to get FDA approval, a drug must be used to diagnose, prevent, treat,
266
As discussed above, one of the definitions of
or cure a disease.”
“drug” in the FD&C Act is an article “intended to affect the structure
267
or any function of the body of man.” Thus, whether hypotrichosis
268
is a disease is irrelevant; as long as Latisse is intended to affect the
structure of the eyelash, it is a drug and can be FDA-approved if it is
safe and effective for this intended use. Nevertheless, this diseasebranding strategy utilizes the hypotrichosis terminology in order to
medicalize what could be considered a normal condition. Due to the
fact that the diagnosis is subjective (the meaning of “not enough eyelashes” is unclear), patients are more comfortable discussing their
feelings of inadequacy with their doctors because it seems more real
when it is a medical condition with an FDA-approved prescription
treatment.
Finally, a fibromyalgia public service announcement, ostensibly
sponsored by the National Fibromyalgia Association (but cosponsored by Pfizer, the maker of a fibromyalgia drug), demonstrates
the full extent of a disease-branding and drug-mongering campaign.
269
Although it appears to be a help-seeking ad, the public service announcement directs the consumer to a website sponsored by Pfizer,

264

Latisse—“When Your Lashes Grow, Your Lashes Show” (feat. Claire Danes), YOUTUBE
(July 7, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZZ1_CQD1jS8.
265
CR AdWatch: Latisse, CONSUMER REPS., http://bcove.me/3cn3q2sx (last visited
Feb. 4, 2011).
266
Id.
267
21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2006).
268
Regardless, according to the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9CM) diagnosis 374.55, eyelash hypotrichosis is the “condition of having inadequate
or not enough eyelashes.” AM. OPTOMETRIC ASS’N CLINICAL CARE GRP., BULLETIN NO.
4, 1 (2009), available at http://www.aoa.org/documents/Latisse-Bulletin-March-182009.pdf.
269
For a discussion of the types of DTC advertisements, see supra notes 96–98 and
accompanying text.
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which contains a link to Pfizer’s Lyrica website.
Thus, this helpseeking ad seems to be a disguised product-claim ad and seems inextricably linked to a DTC drug advertisement, that is, the Lyrica web271
site.
This example is evidence of the scope of Pfizer’s diseasebranding and drug-mongering campaign for fibroymyalgia and
Lyrica.
The public service announcement begins with a quick cut to patients in visible distress, with tears streaming down their faces, lament272
ing the intense and inexplicable pain they experience. The voiceover begins, “[I]magine feeling this kind of pain and nobody knows
273
what it is or believes you even have it.”
It continues, “This is fibromyalgia, very real widespread pain and tenderness that affects millions. . . . There is hope, there is help. If you’re suffering, talk to
274
your doctor and visit fibrohope.org.”
After quickly browsing the
275
website, one can find a link to “Explore a Fibromyalgia Prescription
Treatment Option,” which takes the consumer to “a product-branded
Web site from Pfizer” referring to Lyrica. Thus, while the commercial
and the website are seemingly designed to raise disease awareness,
276
they are inextricably linked to the prescription drug.
270

Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope, supra note 117. Lyrica is the first FDAapproved drug to treat FMS. FDA News Release, FDA Approves First Drug for Treating
Fibromyalgia
(June
21,
2007),
http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2007/ucm108936.htm.
271
It should be noted that
[w]hen done properly, help-seeking ads are not considered to be drug
ads. Therefore, [FDA] do[es] not regulate true help-seeking ads, but
the FTC does regulate them. If an ad recommends or suggests the use
of a specific drug, however, it is considered a product claim ad that
must comply with FDA rules.
Basics of Drug Ads, supra note 96.
272
Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope, supra note 117.
273
Id.; see also Berenson, supra note 127.
Fibromyalgia is a real disease. Or so says Pfizer in a new television advertising campaign for Lyrica, the first medicine approved to treat the
pain condition, whose very existence is questioned by some doctors. . . .
Many of its sufferers are afflicted by other similarly nebulous conditions, like irritable bowel syndrome.
Id.
274
Facing Fibromyalgia, Finding Hope, supra note 117.
275
Although the link for www.fibrohope.org at the end of the commercial no
longer exists, the first link on a Google search of “fibromyalgia and Pfizer” reveals
www.fibrocenter.com, which leads to a similar website.
See FIBROCENTER,
http://www.fibrocenter.com (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
276
It is possible that this promotion is misbranded. See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMIN., supra note 156, at 6 (“If a disease awareness or help-seeking piece and a re-
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As demonstrated by these examples, disease-branding and drugmongering in the form of DTC advertising intend to make consumers believe that they suffer from serious medical conditions. Consequently, there seems to be sufficient evidence to conclude that DTC
advertising campaigns could constitute outrageous conduct.
2.

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress(NIED)

If the iatrogenic effects from taking the medication are consid277
ered, then a plaintiff may have a successful argument for the physical impact or injury necessary to establish a prima facie case of
278
There is no recovery in tort for NIED unless the plaintiff
NIED.
falls within a recovery-permitting category; the relevant category for
the test case is emotional harm that accompanies a physical impact or
279
injury.
Thus, the law permits a plaintiff to recover for emotional
distress when the plaintiff sustains a physical injury that results from a
280
defendant’s negligence.
In Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley, the plaintiff argued that he suffered severe emotional distress from fear of developing cancer after he was negligently exposed to excessive amounts of
281
asbestos.
The physical contact with asbestos did not amount to
physical impact sufficient for an NIED claim because the plaintiff was
minder advertisement are presented in a manner that causes their messages to be
linked together by the audience, the failure of the combined communication to include the risk [information] . . . would cause the advertised product to be misbranded.”).
277
Dr. Jutel explains the dangers of iatrogenic effects as follows:
The expansion of diagnostic categories is not without risk and can have
severe iatrogenic results. The concordant treatment which accompanies a diagnosis may expose an individual to undesirable, or unintended, secondary effects. The medicalisation of shyness which results in
the diagnoses of Social Phobia, Social Anxiety Disorder and Avoidant
Personality Disorder, as one example, encourages patients to request,
and doctors to recommend, the use of pharmaceutical remedies, some
of which have led to reports of devastating side effects.
Jutel, supra note 43, at 286.
278
The side effects would be insufficient for a products liability claim, so this
cause of action is not considered in this Comment. Moreover, the argument is not
related to the product itself because the plaintiff would not be alleging a failure to
warn, design defect, or manufacturing defect. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (1998).
279
Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 430 (1997).
280
Id.
281
Id. at 427. Although Buckley arose under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act,
the Court relied on common-law tort principles, see id. at 429, thus making the analysis relevant and applicable for our test case.

CETEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

692

5/14/2012 2:29 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:643

282

asymptomatic.
In addition, the Supreme Court explained that a
“‘physical impact’ . . . does not include a simple physical contact with
a substance that might cause a disease at a substantially later time—
where that substance, or related circumstance, threatens no harm
283
other than that disease-related risk.” Accordingly, the rule gleaned
from Buckley is that the mere exposure to deleterious substances or
the possible risk of developing a disease are insufficient for an NIED
claim; rather, some sort of actual physical injury is required.
In Michtavi, the court noted that under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), a prisoner-plaintiff must suffer “less-than-significant-butmore-than-de minimis physical injury” before a civil action can be
284
The plaintiff did not allege that the
brought for mental distress.
prison officials physically harmed him; rather, the plaintiff merely alleged that the prison officials were negligent in allowing fellow in285
mates to succeed in their schemes to defraud him. Thus, the court
concluded that the FTCA claim failed because “the fact that [plaintiff’s] mental condition is treated with medication does not mean
these emotional problems are physical injury. . . . [T]he fact that [the
plaintiff] physically takes medication, or that the medication works
on his physical body, does not mean that the medication is treating
286
physical injury.”
Although taking medication for emotional problems does not
mean that the medication is treating a physical injury, the iatrogenic
effects of the treatment may result in physical injury. This distinction
is relevant to remove the test case from the Michtavi rule. Thus, although the plaintiff in this Comment’s test case is not taking the drug
for emotional distress, a physical injury may arise as an unintended
consequence (side effect) of the pharmaceutical treatment. Accordingly, the physical effect of the drug could become, in essence, the
physical impact element for the cause of action.

282

Id. at 432.
Id. at 430.
284
Michtavi v. United States, No. 4:07-CV-0628, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18926, at
*12 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2009), aff’d, 345 F. App’x. 727 (3d Cir. 2009). Although this
case arose under the FTCA, the court applied the substantive law of the state where
the act occurred. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006). Thus, the discussion of a
physical-injury requirement is analogous to the test case for NIED because it explains
that receiving pharmaceutical treatment for a mental disorder does not establish that
the plaintiff has suffered a physical injury.
285
Michtavi, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18926, at *14-15.
286
Id. at *15.
283
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But in Pennsylvania, for example, a plaintiff alleging an NIED
287
claim “must suffer immediate and substantial physical harm.” In the
test case, this contemporaneous element is missing because the physical impact of the side effect occurs after the plaintiff experiences
emotional distress upon being subjected to the disease-branding and
drug-mongering campaign. Logically, a second bout of emotional
distress could accompany the physical symptoms of suffering from
side effects, but this would remove the analysis from the diseasebranding and drug-mongering scenario. Because the second bout of
emotional distress would be proximately caused by the side effects,
the claim arising in this case would be an emotional distress claim ac288
companying a products-liability case. Thus, to correctly isolate and
define disease-branding and drug-mongering as the causative factors,
one has to assume that the initial bout of emotional distress was proximately caused by, and directly preceded by, the advertising campaign. But if this were the case, then the physical injury element
necessary for the NIED claim could not be satisfied due to lack of
contemporaneousness: the emotional distress would have preceded
the physical injury, which is caused by the drug’s side effects. Therefore, it seems that an NIED cause of action would likely fail.
Furthermore, the “learned intermediary doctrine” might provide
a defense to pharmaceutical company liability. According to this doc289
trine, which almost every jurisdiction has adopted, pharmaceutical
companies have a duty to warn the physician, rather than the consumer as the end user, of a prescription drug’s side effects through
290
adequate labeling. If the warning is adequate, then the drug company essentially delegates its duty to warn to the physician and shields
291
itself from liability.

287

Doe v. Phila. Cmty. Health Alts. AIDS Task Force, 745 A.2d 25, 28 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2000).
288
See supra note 278 (discussing a product liability claim).
289
See Garbutt & Hofmann, supra note 84, at 273. But see Perez v. Wyeth Labs.
Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999) (refusing to shield drug companies from liability
based on the “learned intermediary doctrine” in the context of mass-marketed drugs
through DTC advertising).
290
Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of LearnedIntermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R.5th 1 (1998).
291
See, e.g., Pustejovsky v. PLIVA, Inc., 623 F.3d 271, 276 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Under
the doctrine, the manufacturer may rely on the doctor—the learned intermediary—
to pass on its warnings. Thus, so long as the drug manufacturer properly warns a
prescribing physician of the dangerous propensities of its product, the manufacturer
is excused from warning each patient who receives the drug.”).
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But New Jersey, for example, does not apply the learned intermediary doctrine to drug companies when they engage in massmarketing of drugs because the premises on which the doctrine relies
292
are absent in the DTC advertising context. In Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the learned intermediary doctrine will not apply when a prescription drug manu293
facturer uses DTC advertising to market its drug; instead, drug
companies have a duty to warn patients directly and cannot rely on
the prescribing physician’s knowledge and position of authority to
convey warnings. Essentially, the court explained that “[w]hen mass
marketing of prescription drugs seeks to influence a patient’s choice
of a drug, a pharmaceutical manufacturer that makes direct claims to
consumers . . . should not be unqualifiedly relieved of a duty to pro294
vide proper warnings of the dangers or side effects of the product.”
Although Perez concerns a failure-to-warn claim, the fact that the
learned intermediary doctrine may not apply to DTC advertising is
relevant to an NIED claim based on disease-branding and drugmongering. In New Jersey, the learned intermediary doctrine would
probably not apply to a claim for NIED premised on disease-branding
and drug-mongering; however, in any other jurisdiction, the doctrine
295
would most likely shield drug companies from liability.
Furthermore, the element of “physical impact” in the NIED context raises an interesting and troublesome question as to the proper
defendant.
The drug company’s disease-branding and drugmongering caused the emotional distress and the drug caused the injury, but the company was not negligent in providing the plaintiff
with the injury-causing drug. Thus, in the test case, it seems that the
292

Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255.
Id. at 1257; see also In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F.
Supp. 2d 795, 811–12 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (analyzing Perez). See generally Garbutt &
Hofmann, supra note 84, at 273. (“[DTC advertising] essentially bypasses the ‘intermediary’ . . . . Thus, the role of the physician . . . is greatly diminished and pharmaceutical companies should not be able to benefit from the learned intermediary doctrine.”).
294
Perez, 734 A.2d at 1247.
295
New Jersey seems to be the only jurisdiction to recognize a DTC-advertising
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine. See Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F.
Supp. 2d 1360, 1376–77 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“While the Perez court found that the law
should be changing in response to changes in marketing strategies by drug manufacturers, New Jersey is the only state to have done so. It is now eight years since Perez
was decided, and no other state has followed suit.”). But see Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 310 S.W.3d 476, 508 (Tex. App. 2010) (“[T]he theoretical underpinnings of the
‘learned intermediary’ doctrine do not apply when a drug manufacturer directly
markets to its consumers, the patients.”), review granted (Aug. 11, 2011).
293
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plaintiff’s emotional distress cannot be attributed to a drug company’s negligent conduct. The drug company is not liable for negligence for the physical injury sustained by the plaintiff because the
plaintiff autonomously purchased and ingested a drug that the FDA
approved as safe and effective, and the physical injury (side effect)
occurred afterward. Thus, the only potential party whose negligent
conduct caused a physical injury to the plaintiff would be the treating
physician. Consequently, the plaintiff may have an alternative cause
of action for medical malpractice for wrongful diagnosis or negligent
prescribing practices.
3.

Medical Malpractice

A plaintiff alleging medical malpractice premised on a theory of
negligent diagnosis and treatment must establish four elements: duty,
296
breach, causation, and damages. The breach element may be satisfied if the doctor’s “actions demonstrate either a lack of skill or care,
297
or failure to give careful and proper attention to his patient.” Fail298
ure to consider a differential diagnosis may violate the standard of
care and establish breach, as it provides evidence of the physician’s
299
lack of proper attention to the patient’s case. This is because
[a]n incorrect diagnosis of a patient’s condition may produce
harmful results either by inducing the patient to forgo the proper
treatment which would have corrected the illness, or by leading
the defendant to give treatment which is harmful in and of itself,
aside from the failure to treat the condition with which the plain300
tiff is actually afflicted.

In Wojton v. United States, for example, the plaintiff alleged four acts
of negligence against the Veterans Administration for: (1) wrongful
diagnosis of schizophrenia, (2) wrongful prescribing of schizophrenia
medication, (3) failure to diagnose PTSD, and (4) failure to prescribe

296

See 22 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 185, § 106.02.
Heimlicher v. Steele, 615 F. Supp. 2d 884, 910 (N.D. Iowa 2009).
298
Differential diagnosis is “[t]he method of distinguishing between two or more
diseases having similar symptoms by carefully comparing and evaluating the few dissimilar characteristics and signs, and thus making a final diagnosis.” 2-D ATTORNEYS’
DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE D-34474 (2009).
299
E.g., Trowbridge v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1142 (D. Idaho 2010)
(holding that a doctor breached the standard of care in formulating differential diagnoses and treatment plans).
300
W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Proximate Cause in Malpractice Cases, 13 A.L.R.2d 11
(2008).
297
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301

PTSD medication. Although neither the plaintiff nor the court addressed these claims in terms of failure to consider a differential diagnosis, the diagnostic criteria for these mental disorders suggest that
302
the inference is clear.
Misdiagnosing these two disorders is common due to the subjective experience of hallucinations.
Analogously, because of the subjective diagnostic criteria of FMS
and IBS, a medical malpractice claim could arise if the physician negligently failed to consider the vast array of differential diagnoses for
these disorders. A differential diagnosis is critical when evaluating
FMS because “[t]here are no tests and no combination of symptoms
and signs that signify without doubt that a patient has fibromyal303
gia.”
Thus, “a number of distinctive disorders may share a few or
several signs and symptoms with fibromyalgia, sometimes making a
304
distinction very difficult.” For example, hypothyroidism may cause
fatigue and widespread soft tissue tenderness and thus can masquer305
An article on the differential diagnosis of fiade as fibromyalgia.
bromyalgia notes that
[t]he multiple symptoms of fibromyalgia often overlap with those
of related disorders and may further complicate the diagnosis.
One of the most challenging diagnostic dilemmas that clinicians
face is distinguishing fibromyalgia from other central pain disorders (e.g., irritable bowel syndrome, chronic fatigue syndrome,
migraine) . . . . To date, there is no “gold standard” for diagnosing fibromyalgia. Until a better clinical case definition of fibromyalgia exists, all diagnostic criteria should be interpreted with cau306
tion, considered rudimentary, and subject to modification.

Similarly, “[b]ecause there are usually no physical signs to definitively
diagnose irritable bowel syndrome, diagnosis is often a process of

301

199 F. Supp. 2d 722, 724 (D. Ohio 2002).
See DSM-IV-TR, 2000, supra note 3, at 467 (“Flashbacks in Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder must be distinguished from illusions, hallucinations, and other perceptual
disturbances that may occur in Schizophrenia . . . .”); 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL.
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 9:33
(2011–12) (noting that flashbacks are the “the PTSD symptoms . . . [that] appear to
involve a level of reality distortion comparable to that in schizophrenia”).
303
David A. Cramer, Fibroymalgia—Clinical Features and Diagnosis, in 6 ATTORNEYS’
TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 25.30, 25.30 (Roscoe N. Gray & Louise J. Gordy eds., 3d ed.,
2011).
304
Id. at 25.37.
305
Id.
306
D.L. Goldenberg, Diagnosis and Differential Diagnosis of Fibromyalgia, 122 AM. J.
MED. (12 Supp.) S14, S14 (2009).
302
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307

elimination.” Differential diagnoses for IBS include ulcerative coli308
tis, diverticulitis, and Crohn’s disease.
In addition, celiac disease
and lactose intolerance may cause signs and symptoms similar to
309
IBS.
Thus, one could imagine a cause of action parallel to Wojton for
FMS or IBS: (1) wrongful diagnosis of FMS or IBS, (2) wrongful prescribing of Lyrica or Zelnorm, (3) failure to diagnose, for example,
hypothyroidism or Crohn’s disease, and (4) failure to prescribe drugs
for these conditions. A patient presenting with gastrointestinal complaints who self-diagnoses as having IBS and seeks a prescription for
Zelnorm (based on the cumulative impact of a disease-mongering
campaign), may in fact have a number of other diseases. If the doctor fails to consider these differential diagnoses, fails to order appropriate tests, and thereby wrongfully diagnoses IBS, the doctor may be
liable for malpractice if the patient suffers adverse reactions to
Zelnorm.
Medical malpractice lawsuits could be a weapon against diseasebranding and drug-mongering, but they only work in individual cases
against individual doctors. Although individual incidents may be
remedied through medical malpractice cases, this would not produce
systemic change in pharmaceutical companies’ promotion of their
products. And while successful medical malpractice claims create
precedent for which other victims of disease-branding and drugmongering could rely, this would probably only affect doctors’ diagnostic procedures rather than their prescribing habits. In other
words, when patients complain of disease-branded symptoms, physicians would be more likely to consider differential diagnoses, rather
than refuse to prescribe a drug and facilitate the drug-mongering.
Thus, any attempt to “starve the pharmaceutical beast” by suing doctors in an effort to prevent drug overprescribing would likely fail to
address the institutionalized practice of DTC advertising central to
disease-branding and drug-mongering campaigns.
Ultimately, it seems possible to file a complaint for IIED based
on the alleged outrageousness of DTC advertising campaigns, and
307
Irritable Bowel Syndrome—Tests and Diagnoses, MAYO CLINIC (July 29, 2011),
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/irritable-bowelsyndrome/DS00106/DSECTION=tests-and-diagnosis [hereinafter Irritable Bowel Syndrome—Tests and Diagnoses].
308
3 ATTORNEYS’ DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE I-62839 (2009); see also Hans Tester, Ulcerative Colitis, in 16 ATTORNEYS’ TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, supra note 303, at 231.50,
231.54(3).
309
Irritable Bowel Syndrome–Tests and Diagnoses, supra note 307.
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while the case may reach adjudication on the merits, it seems insufficient to significantly alter pharmaceutical promotional practices. In
addition, an NIED claim would probably fail due to the lack of contemporaneousness between emotional distress and injury; also the
learned intermediary doctrine would pose a formidable defense to an
NIED case. Finally, medical malpractice claims seem to be a viable,
although still insufficient, option that could circuitously influence
how pharmaceutical companies advertise. Notwithstanding the potential for establishing precedent, even if a test case is won and affirmed on appeal, these litigious retrospective strategies would ultimately be ineffective at producing real, systemic change in diseasebranding and drug-mongering promotional practices. Therefore, the
critics of these practices should look to the legislative arena to combat the specific pharmaceutical promotional strategies that they consider particularly egregious and detrimental to public health. Legislative reform, as a prospective remedy, can address the practices on a
comprehensive, collaborative, and systemic level, without resorting to
the expensive, time-consuming, and highly-particularized adversarial
process.
C. Legislative Prescriptions for Reform: Understanding and Promoting
“Academic Detailing”
Rather than relying on the inherently retrospective remedy of
310
litigation, it is possible to construct prospective policy solutions.
For example, educating doctors about drug-mongering and diseasebranding, through a process called “academic detailing,” could curb
311
the arguably detrimental effects of these advertising practices. Academic detailing is the process by which non-profit entities send
trained healthcare professionals to physicians’ offices to educate
310

Cf. Lambdin, supra note 240, at 170–71.
While it may ultimately be out of the hands of the courts and the FDA
to impose harsher restrictions on direct-to-consumer advertising, if the
public continues to hear statements [warning how DTC marketing has
led to irresponsible prescribing practices that jeopardize patient safety], it is highly likely that it will be able to initiate reform on its own, as
the pendulum of public perception swings from one of acceptance to
suspicion in the realm of direct-to-consumer advertising.

Id.
311
But see Iona Heath, Combating Disease Mongering: Daunting but Nonetheless EssenMED.
448,
448
(2006),
available
at
tial,
3
PLOS
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.00
30146 (“The challenges of combating the current epidemic of disease mongering is
daunting, and anyone looking for ready solutions should read no further.”).
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them about drugs and prescribing practices.
Essentially, qualified
experts, “[u]sing some of the techniques of behavioral science that
drug reps use, but without the financial incentives of gifts and samples,” train doctors about drug-treatment options and prescribing
313
practices.
The most important techniques of academic detailing include
“conducting interviews to investigate baseline knowledge and motivations for current prescribing patterns . . . [and] establishing credibility through a respected organizational identity, referencing authoritative and unbiased sources of information, and presenting both sides
314
of controversial issues.”
Accordingly, academic detailing “combat[s] pharmaceutical sales reps[’] influence on prescribing, and
315
help[s] get doctors the best evidence—without the sales pitch.” Because DTC advertising gives consumers increased access to information, academic detailing will allow doctors to regain their medical
authority by becoming knowledgeable about pharmaceutical promotional practices in an effort to combat the effects of DTC advertising
316
on patients.
Doctors should be aware of disease-branding and drug317
They “should be wary of exaggerated claims and
mongering.
should place the same amount of scrutiny on ads for prescription
318
drugs as [they] would on any other advertisement.” Academic detailing would thus provide physicians with the tools to recognize
drug-seeking behavior associated with disease-branding and drugmongering strategies. By making doctors aware of these promotional

312
Susan Poser, Unlabeled Drug Samples and the Learned Intermediary: The Case for
Drug Company Liability Without Preemption, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 653, 691–92 (2007);
see also Academic Detailing and the Odds at Agincourt, POSTSCRIPT BLOG (Apr. 22, 2010,
10:28 AM), http://postscript.communitycatalyst.org/?p=1254 [hereinafter Academic
Detailing and the Odds at Agincourt].
313
Poser, supra note 312, at 692.
314
Stephen B. Soumerai & Jerry Avorn, Principles of Educational Outreach (‘Academic
Detailing’) to Improve Clinical Decision Making, 263 JAMA 549, 549 (1990).
315
Kate Petersen, Academic Detailing Moves Ahead at the State, Federal Level,
BLOG
(Feb.
25,
2010,
10:23
AM),
POSTSCRIPT
http://postscript.communitycatalyst.org/?p=1150.
316
See Poser, supra note 312, at 692 (“The goal of academic detailing is to counteract the influence of drug reps, improve clinical decision making by physicians,
and respond to pressure to minimize healthcare costs.”).
317
Shankar & Subish, supra note 105, at 278.
318
Ishmeal Bradley, Talk to Your Doctor: Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription
Drugs, Part 3, CLINICAL CORRELATIONS (Aug. 13, 2010, 11:30 AM),
http://www.clinicalcorrelations.org/?p=2990.
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practices, and reiterating the importance of differential diagnoses
and alternative treatment options, academic detailing would be an
effective tool to combat these practices. Moreover, open communication between physicians and patients, both with full knowledge of
disease-branding and drug-mongering practices, would expose the
manipulative effects of these practices and allow for more rational
prescription drug use. In fact, research suggests that academic detailing is an effective way to counteract the influence of pharmaceutical
319
promotional practices and reduce inappropriate prescribing.
For
example, one study published in the New England Journal of Medicine concluded that “[a]cademically based ‘detailing’ may represent
a useful and cost-effective way to improve the quality of drug-therapy
320
decisions and reduce unnecessary expenditures.”
Growing interest in academic detailing “is part of a growing
awareness that pharmaceutical marketing has the potential to interfere with safe prescribing and patient care—and a broader effort to
321
make sure it doesn’t.” The problems associated with drug marketing have captured Congress’s attention and inspired it to act. The
Independent Drug Education and Outreach Act (IDEA), a bill that
was introduced in the House of Representatives and Senate but died
in committee, would have provided “grants or contracts for prescription drug education and outreach for healthcare providers and their
322
patients.” The relevant section of the act would have required the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to award contracts to “eligible entities for the development and implementation of programs to
appropriately train and deploy healthcare professionals to educate
physicians and other drug prescribers concerning the relative safety,
relative effectiveness, and relative cost of prescription drugs and their
323
alternatives.”
The bill was premised on the notion that “[o]ffice calls work.
That’s why they are the preferred sales tactic of industry. So it makes
sense that governments and others who actually foot the cost of pre319

See, e.g., Jerry Avorn & Stephen B. Soumerai, Improving Drug-Therapy Decisions
through Educational Outreach—A Randomized Controlled Trial of Academically Based Detailing, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1457 (1983); M.A. O’Brien et al., Educational Outreach Visits:
Effects on Professional Practice and Health Care Outcomes, 4 COCHRANE DATABASE SYS.
REVS. CD000409 (2007); Soumerai & Avorn, supra note 314.
320
Avorn & Soumerai, supra note 319, at 1457.
321
Academic Detailing and the Odds at Agincourt, supra note 312.
322
Independent Drug Education and Outreach Act of 2009 (IDEA), S. 767, 111th
Cong. (2009).
323
S.767 § 904(c).
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scription drugs should adopt the same tactic, albeit with the goal of
324
encouraging the use of the best, safest, most cost-effective drugs.”
Therefore, IDEA should be reintroduced, and ultimately enacted into law, as a prospective remedy for the detrimental effects of diseasebranding and drug-mongering. The bill could be amended to also
create advisory committees composed of sociology, marketing, and
psychology experts to help construct academic-detailing protocols
and public-health outreach programs. These protocols and programs
would facilitate the academic detailer’s role in explaining to doctors
and patients the power of medicalization—how social forces impact
the definition of diseases, how disease is thus socially constructed,
and how medicalization can be influenced by aggressive promotional
practices. The advisory committee recommendations could clarify
the sociology-of-health critique of disease-branding and drugmongering, and the increased knowledge of these phenomena would
yield a stronger defense arsenal for both prescribing physicians and
patients.
Ultimately, this legislative prescription would not alter the FDA’s
regulatory authority over DTC advertising and would leave the FD&C
325
Act and associated regulations intact, but would provide an alternative educational method of combating the deleterious effects of otherwise-legal advertising and promotional practices.
V. CONCLUSION
The problems of disease-branding and drug-mongering have become rampant in our society, though at this juncture it is uncontested that they do not, as a general matter, violate any existing laws.
These phenomena have surfaced as a result of relatively relaxed FDA
regulation of DTC advertising. Drug companies have recognized the
utility of socially constructing diseases and have employed this technique into effective advertising practices. It might be possible to
bring a cause of action against drug companies and, somewhat derivatively, against prescribing physicians for these practices, but it seems
that the most likely way to effect change in this area of law would be
through legislation and education.
The likelihood of success for an IIED claim is improbable, and
an NIED claim would most likely fail for a variety of reasons including
324

The Next Big IDEA: Prescriber Education, POSTSCRIPT BLOG (July 31, 2008, 1:16
PM), http://postscript.communitycatalyst.org/?p=179.
325
The bill would amend the Public Health Service Act only by adding additional
sections. See S. 767 § 2.
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the lack of contemporaneousness with distress and injury and the
learned intermediary doctrine defense. Furthermore, while medical
malpractice claims against prescribing physicians for wrongful diagnosis might be successful on an individual basis, they would not bring
about any substantial changes in drug-company advertising practices.
Thus, critics of disease-branding and drug-mongering seem to be left
without an effective legal remedy, and any such remedy would certainly not lead to, or result in, overhaul in a way that legislation
could.
Therefore, because the promotional practices are legal and generally do not rise to the level of tortious conduct, critics of diseasebranding and drug-mongering ought to consider legislative reform
efforts to address pharmaceutical promotional practices and ameliorate their public health effects. Enhancing physicians’ and consumers’ knowledge would enable them to recognize disease-branding and
drug-mongering and cope better with the torrent of such practices.
Instituting academic-detailing programs would combat these practices in a systemic and non-litigious way by counteracting the effects of
DTC advertising on consumer demand and physician prescribing
habits.
Although these promotional practices will probably never go
away, it is certainly possible for the pharmaceutical industry, the FDA,
and critics alike to coexist more harmoniously. If these relevant
stakeholders were aware of the existing competing economic and
public-health goals, then educated doctors and consumers could select which drugs are medically necessary, rather than being persuaded by the industry’s disease-branding and drug-mongering practices.

